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INTRODUCTION

1. Defining thè Research
This study is an attempt to analyze labor conflicts in 
France, Italy, and thè United Kingdom since World War II.
More precisely it will focalize on a particular expression of 
labor conflicts, namely, strikes, which are defined by 
H i c k s ^  as an "abstension from work, usually planned, by a 
considerable number of workers." This definition includes 
two elements, thè group factor and thè organizational factor, 
that distinguisi! strikes from -other forms of work conflicts 
such as lateness, registered or unregistered sickness, or 
absenteeism. In fact, these two elements are always present 
during a strike and contrast with thè individuality and thè 
individuai willingness which are present in other forms of 
conflict usually grouped under thè heading of "unorganized 
conflict".^
The motivations that led to choosing strikes as thè 
area of study are interrelated: thè Constant manifestation
of strike phenomena— even though their progress has been 
multicyclical— that has allowed thè systematic gathering of 
statistics since 1880, and thè importance of thè phenomena 
because of their disruptive consequences both for thè firm 
and for thè industry and thè economy as a whole.
(1)J. Hicks (1959), pp. 146-7.
(2) • .The definition also includes thè element "abstension from
work" which allows strikes to be distinguished from other 
forms of conflict such as work to rule, production slow- 
down, sabotage, and stopping overtime, about which, nevertheless 
there is no systematic statistical Information.
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The choice of countries fell on Italy, France, and Great 
Britain because they demonstrate similar developments of thè 
basic indicators of conflict, that is, relative number of 
strikes, relative number of strikers, and relative number of 
mandays lost as Tables 1, 2, and 3 of thè appendix s h o w . ^
The period of time under consideration had been limited 
to thè past thirty years, thè period in which thè development 
of industriai relations and of thè economie system allows 
comparison more easily and in which common events (conflicts 
in 1969, oil price increase of 1973, two-digit world-wide 
inflation) makes thè study more interesting.
2. Criticai Considerations of thè Main Theories 
of "Industriai Conflict"
The principal theories of thè industriai conflict will be 
briefly treated. Notwithstanding thè variety of approaches 
and thè numerous studies undertaken, these can be divided into 
four main lines of thought:
1. considering a strike as a protest originated 
by rapid social changes,
2. considering thè strike within a process of 
institutionalization of thè conflict,
3. considering thè strike from an economie point
(2)of view which attributes its significance 
to an element of bargaining process,
4. considering thè strike from an organizational- 
political viewpoint which looks upon thè strike
(1)Cfr. Flora Tables 1, 2, 3.
( 2 ) . .In my opinion, thè term "economie" is inappropriate. The 
reason for this will be explained later.
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as a foriti of collective action. ^
According to thè modernization approach, rapid social
changes and, in particular, high rates of industrialization which
stimulate large-scale migration and rapid urbanization, are
thè causes of social tension and psychic dislocation which in
turn create protests of which thè strike is just one
form. This theory, which foresees thè absorption of thè
conflict in advanced industriai societies, better adapts itself
to a lengthy study which includes also phases of pre-
(3)capitalist development.
Since World War II, there has been rapid social change, 
for example, thè phenomenon of an industrialization and 
concentration in northern Italy followed by a massive internai 
migration, but this rapid change can only partially explain 
thè increase in industriai conflicts in thè 1960's and not its
It is possible to take into consideration another 
theoretical approach called structural which analyzes thè 
conflict as regards to thè differentials of conflict.
These are explained by thè social structure of thè community 
in which workers live and thè technical structures of thè
work place. See C. Kerr and A. Siegei, 1954; J.M. 
Goldthorpe, 1968; and D. Lockwood, 1966 who creates a 
typology of workers which includes thè traditional pro- 
letarians (highly strike prone, high degree of job 
involvement, and strong attachments to primary work groups), 
deferential workers (jobs that involve d o s e  contact with 
superiors and reinforce vertical rather than horizontal 
loyalties), and modern privatized workers (high wage, mass 
produced industries, new-town, home-centers, and consumption 
oriented life styles).
^ E .  Durkheim, 1951; N. Smelser, 1963.
C. Kerr, F. Harbison, J. Dunlop, C. Meyers, 1960.(3)
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development.^ In other words, this theory can explain some 
waves of conflict, or even an upwards shift of thè function of 
strikes, but not thè development of industriai conflicts in 
time.(2)
The second line of thought tries to interpret thè strike 
process as phases of a process of institutionalization of 
conflict (D. Hibbs) in which a reduction of thè industriai
It is important to remember two particular interpretations 
of this theory by H. Clegg (1970) and by A. Flander (1970) 
that view strikes as an escape valve and as a way of conveying 
structural change at thè economie level and changes in thè 
institutionalization of industriai relations.
( 2 )'To this theoretical line of reasoning could perhaps be 
related thè three hypotheses on thè contemporaneousness 
of conflict at thè end of thè 1960's: thè monetarist theory,
which attributes thè increase in conflicts to thè increase 
in world prices; thè theory of depressed salaries (D. Soskice, 
1977) in which thè moving factor is thè wage reduction in 
respect to profits and thè relative increase of salary 
differentials; and finally, thè generational leap theory 
(E. Tarantelli, 1980) in which thè increase in education and 
in diffusion of information gave way to a new labor-force, 
to whose social and participative demands thè socio-political 
system (not only economie) was not able to give a 
satisfactory response, thereby creating frustrations leading 
to protest.
These three hypotheses are on thè potentiality of conflict 
(M. Regini, 1980) or, to use terms more frequently used, on 
thè "propensity," and not thè "opportunity," to strike. In 
order to change these conflictual charges into manifestations 
of conflict, that is in strikes, it is necessary tò use a 
theory that ties them to strikes themselves. It is 
necessary to remember thè importance of thè above- 
mentioned theories in explaining thè contemporaneous of 
conflicts at thè end of thè sixties, and in indicating political- 
economic remedies to regulate thè conflict potential. One 
could, perhaps, reach greater autonomy by developing a 
"threshold" theory of inflation, salary differentials, and 
changes in education that are able to provoke, as in thè 
modernization theory, psychic dislocation and anomy 
capable of creating generai social conflict.
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conflict is seen as a result of a change in place of thè dis- 
tribution of revenues and, therefore, of thè struggie about dis- 
tribution which shifts from thè economie arena (or market) to thè 
politicai one. Thus, thè strike, which is a characteristic 
instrument of thè economie arena, leaves room for other forms 
of protest such as politicai demonstrations, generai strikes, 
thè vote, e t c . ^  This approach focuses on industriai 
relations more than on strikes and, therefore, is not adapted 
to analyzing work conflicts.
The so-called economie theory analyzes strikes within thè
Bargaining Theory, which is a model of rational negotiation
between Management and Trade Unions on thè wage level. In this
approach, strikes have thè basic function of an "equilibrating
mechanism to square up thè union membership wage expectations
( 2 )with what thè firm may be prepared to pay." Explainmg 
strikes then means to first estimate how much workers' 
expectations exceed what thè firm may be prepared to pay at 
any given moment. Particularly, thè more workers1 expectations 
exceed thè capacity of thè firm to pay, thè higher thè proba- 
bility of a strike. At thè same time, thè strength and 
willingness to negotiate of thè two partners become thè 
explicative variables of thè conflict function in time. These 
two elements are influenced by variations in thè economie (3)cycle, of which thè unemployment rate is taken as a proxy,(4)and by variations m  thè reai wage.
{1)D. Hibbs, 1970.
O. Ashenfelter and G. Johnson, 1969.
(3)A. Rees, 1952. 
f 4) O. Ashenfelter and G. Johnson, 1969; J. Pencavel, 1970.
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The fourth approach stresses thè necessity of thè
organizational factor in transforming everything
considered potential conflicts into reai conflicts,
strikes. Shorter and T i l l y , ^  thè most important representa-
tives of this approach, consider thè industriai conflict as a
( 2 )form of collective action taken to acquire power.
Referring back to thè concept of M. O l s o n ^  that individuals 
get together to pursue common goals is problematic and 
not inevitable, they emphasize that strikes take place 
because an organizational capacity for this type of action 
exists. They defend thè independence and thè priority of 
thè organizational factor in thè manifestation of conflict 
(thè strike). Shorter and Tilly, expect thè
explicative variable of strike fluctuations is thè mobilization 
(thè organizational capacity for collective action) of thè 
workers which is measured by thè rate of unionization and is 
thè main indicator of thè probability of success of strikes.
They also consider politicai variables (changes of government, 
election years) important because they indicate a greater 
vulnerability of government with respect to thè collective 
demands of thè union as expressed by strikes.
Snyder,^ however, explains strike fluctuation by comparing 
and contrasting thè economie and political-organizational 
approaches. However, he limited thè use of thè economie one 
to cases in which collective bargaining is definitely institu- 
tionalized, unionization is widespread and stable, and thè workers 
(thè union)_ as ' a legitimate interest group, are
^ R .  Shorter and C. Tilly» 1974.
( 2 ) By collective action is meant thè application of united 
resources in order to reach a common objective.
(3)M. Olson, 1965.
(4)D. Snyder, 1975.
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integrated into thè politicai system. Testing thè two models in 
France, Italy, and thè U.S.A., he finds thè economie model to 
be highly elucidative only in thè U.S.A. from 1949 to 
1970, when thè above-mentioned conditions were met. In 
his opinion, thè use of thè economie model is secondary in 
respect to thè political-organizational one, only 
when particular stable conditions exist for unionization, 
integration of thè union, and institutionalization of its 
relationship to thè politicai system. He concludes by con­
sidering thè political-organizational model as being more 
generally applicable and more explicative than thè economie 
model.
On thè other hand, it is my impression that it is correct 
to point out thè inadequacies of thè so-called economie model 
which, in fact, is not able to explain sudden waves of 
conflict that originate with thè big shocks thè socio-political 
system undergoes. This is not meant to say that thè explica­
tive ability of thè model is secondary, but to imply thè 
necessity of trying to incorporate into thè model some changes 
that have become an integrai part of thè very structure of 
thè economie system. Often when speaking of economie models, 
one loses sight of their originai purpose, such as, when thè 
model was created, and what it was intended to explain.
The economie model is a model of Bargaining Theory that attempts 
to explain only wage claims and therefore wage strikes within 
thè bargaining system between Management and Trade Unions 
(Trade Union leadership and Trade Union rank and file, in thè 
best of cases).^  It originated in a particular period of 
history, thè fifties, in a particular country, thè U.S., in 
which strikes could be interpreted only as a wage claim. Even 
if they did not include all union conflicts, they represented
^ 0 .  Ashenfelter and G. Johnson, 1969.
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almost all of them. This misleading interpretation is borne out 
by thè frequent tests of thè model using data on global strikes 
and not only on pay-strikes. To lose sight of this coordinate 
by speaking generically of thè economie model (I refer not only 
to Snyder but also to many others who have adopted this term) 
and to maintain that it is insignificant means to under- 
estimate thè inappropriate context into which it has fallen 
and, above all, thè insufficiency of economie theory on 
industriai conflict.
This lacuna becomes even greater when after 1968 and 1973, 
within a changed economie context, thè loss of jobs and 
unemployment impend upon thè workers' daily lives, and job 
security is a fundamental theme of European unions.^
3. The Line of Interpretation of thè Research
The analysis will be focused on thè third above- 
mentioned theoretical approach and will try to go beyond thè 
specified limits of thè Bargaining Theory model. In 
choosing a theoretical paradigm as a reference there is also 
a fundamental choice, which is not to be underestimated, 
that deals with thè value and significance originally attributed 
to strikes.
The political-organizational paradigm clearly emphasizes 
thè politicai significance of strikes and thè role of unions 
as a legitimate interest group in thè power struggle of thè 
socio-political system.
Though in this context of contrasting thè various 
theoretical approaches to thè industriai conflict thè 
negotiating character of thè model to be used had been 
emphasized, in thè following chapter on Bargaining 
Theory it will be necessary to emphasize its economie 
character as game theory, from which bargaining is derived, 
as is widely used in various disciplines.
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Though not negating this significance-, thè economie paradigm 
attributes importance only to thè job market (salary, work 
conditions, etc.) while at thè same time not underestimating thè 
fact that an increase in power and influence in thè economie 
system has almost direct repercussions on thè socio-political 
system. The so-called struggles for power happen, according to 
thè bargaining paradigm, in thè economie arena to then pass on 
to thè politicai one (to paraphrase D. Hibbs) which, however, 
puts pressure on these struggles but, above all, is not a 
determining factor for them.
To choose thè bargaining paradigm implicitly means to 
underestimate thè politicai connotations of strikes which, if 
thè strikes are of a particular intensity at certain points 
(for example, thè housing and social reform strikes in Italy 
and Great Britain in 1969-1970), can be assimilated into a 
component of thè national socio-political system.
For this reason, thè comparison between thè results of 
thè development of thè Bargaining Theory paradigm will be 
rigorously maintained within national characteristic patterns 
of conflict and wherever useful, thè most significant 
institutional differences and changes will be explained.
^ F r o m  now on thè term "bargaining model" will be used, and 
not economie model.

CHAPTER ONE
The Bargaining Theory Approach
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In this chapter, thè theoretical paradigm of Bargaining 
Theory will be developed, from its origins in thè Game Theory 
to more recent developments. Operational versions and 
econometrie tests will be undertaken concluding witn a series 
of criticisms on thè approach.
1.1.1 The Origins of thè Bargaining Theory
The first formulations of Bargaining Theory were 
developed from thè application of thè Game T h e o r y ^  to 
negotiations between management and thè union (or workers).
Game Theory, based on a perfect understanding 
of thè gains and losses thè partners will have as a result of 
such decision, does not seem applicable to negotiation because 
thè two parties have only imperfect information on gains 
received from a certain choice. One can suppose that such gains 
are partially risks and think of maximizing thè mathematical 
expectation^ (which is equal to defining a Cardinal utility 
function).^
For example, Simon,(4) defines thè utility function for 
labor and for management with respect to two parameters, w (wages) 
and x (working conditions). Between thè two extremes of a
^ J .  Von Neuman, O. Morgenstern, 1947.
( 2) The mathematical expectation of thè random variable X, is 
thè average value weighted by thè relative probabilities.
(3) For a systematic profile on thè authors mentioned, see
S. Troiani, 1979, pp. 13-25, and for a more detailed examinations, 
see thè collection of essays by O.R. Young, 1975.
(4) H. Simon, 1951.
Hi!
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job so tiring and a wage so low that thè worker is unable to 
accept these conditions, and of productivity so low and 
wages so high that thè employer prefers to d o s e  thè factory, 
there is a series of intermediate combinations which are all 
connected to thè threat of a strike or a lock-out. in order 
to reach an agreement, it is necessary for both parties that 
their utility exceed their disutility. The series of 
solutions guarantee thè largest sum of thè two utility 
functions will be preferred.
This analysis is developed by N a s h ^  in a way more 
conducive to our purposes with his "optimal threat" strategy. He 
discusses thè situations given by thè Game Theory at a nonzero 
sum which involve two parties whose interests are neither 
completely opposed nor completely alike within thè Cooperative 
Theory in as much as it presumes thè two parties are able to 
rationally discuss their problems and come to an agreement.
The objective of any threatening action, be it strike or lock- 
out, is to increase thè cost of conflict for thè adversary 
in negotiating without increasing one's own cost at thè 
same time. The hypothesis that thè two parties know
perfectly well thè rules of thè game and their roles can lead 
to determining thè correct threat for each of thè parties.
If to this threat compatible claims are tied, there will be 
an immediate and satisfying agreement. In thè opposite 
situation, though, one of thè two partners will have to 
actualize his threat in order to reduce part of thè adversary's 
surplus utility in order to reach an equilibrium. The 
solution will be given by thè maximum product of thè net 
Utilities of thè two partners.
Even before Nash and thè formulation of thè Game Theory,
{1)J. Nash, 1953.
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Z e u t h e n ^  had formulated his theory of thè bargaining system.
It is focused on "maximum risk," which is thè maximum proba- 
bility of conflict that each partner in play is willing to 
tolerate in order to obtain most favorable conditions rather 
than alternatives more favorable to his counterpart.
The two relations of "maximum risk" characterize thè 
strength of "determination" of thè partners in negotiations to 
fight in order to obtain thè most favorable alternative. 
Nonetheless, each of thè partners will begin to make concessions 
when they realize that thè determination of thè other (to risk 
conflict) is greater than their own, and that these concessions 
must be such as to invert thè relation of thè determination of 
thè Utilities of thè partners.
After a finite number of subsequent steps, thè two partners 
will reach. an accord that will represent— to use Nash's 
terms— thè maximum product of their utility.
(2)Pen tries to surpass Zeuthen’s model by constructmg a 
function of ophelimity of thè negotiating partners, characterized 
in this case by thè wage level. To this, given thè mutuai 
dependence of thè partners, a conflict ophelimity is tied which 
does not depend on contracted wage but on other factors.such as
F. Zeuthen, 1930. The formula in Harsanyi's terms for thè 
maximum subjective probability of conflict for each party in 
play is:
n -  n n -  n
11  12  22  21 C = ----------  C = ----------
1 TI 2 TI
1 1  2 1
where n^^ is thè net utility of i' person in condition j.
The point of maximum utility will be c = c = 0 .1 2
*2)J. Pen, 1952.
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profits, politicai considerations, and "ludic" considerations, 
that is satisfaction with thè results.
In this way, thè author tries to free thè partners' choice 
from thè rationality limits of thè same choice that in 
Zeuthen's model lead to characterize thè point of equilibrium 
in thè equalizing of thè two risk tendencies.
The difference between thè first and second functions 
gives rise to net contract ophelimity that singles out for 
each partner thè conflict risk estimate and their own tendency 
to fight which in equilibrium are equal.
On thè other hand, H i c k s ^  speaks of thè employer's 
concession curve and workers’ resistance curve, both in 
increasing and decreasing function to thè relation between 
wages and foreseen strike duration. The former starts out at 
thè wage level thè employer would be willing to pay without 
workers' claims and asymptomatically reaches a level "beyond 
which no workers' league can force thè employer to go."
^ J . R .  Hicks, 1959.
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The latter goes down from a wage level much higher than that 
which thè employer can reasonably concede to one to which 
"thè workers maintain in a particular way to have a right" and 
ends at a minimum salary "because there must be a maximum time 
beyond which workers cannot persevere in their resistance."
The point where thè two curves intersect represents thè 
maximum salary that can be obtained while avoiding a strike 
threat; "thè highest wage that skillful negotiations can get 
out of management." This asymmetry originates from thè two basic 
asymmetries of thè model, which implicitly assumes that thè 
employer knows thè position of thè workers' resistance curve and 
not vice versa, and that thè trade union propose a wage increase 
while management, instead of making other offers, limits itself 
to accepting or rejecting that proposai.^
The last author I would like to mention regarding thè
series of models for determining wages in a bilateral monopoly
( 2 )is Shubik. He emphasizes, as did Hicks, that ìf thè
information of thè negotiating partners be without error, then 
a strike will not take place and there would be only a 
variation in thè distribution of profits according to thè 
business cycle. A high level of information facilitates an 
accord; a low rate of information, on thè other hand, apart 
from thè phase of thè business cycle, increases thè likelihood 
of a strike or a lock-out.
Having also mentioned this last contribution permits one 
to emphasize that in thè area of so-called classical Game Theory,
R.L. Bishop, 1964, synthesized thè two classic theories of 
Zeuthen and Hicks into one composite Zeuthen-Hicks theory 
which, though better than thè two separate ones, substantially 
maintains their limitations.
(2)M. Shubik, 1964.
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given thè assumption of rationality and of perfect and complete 
information of thè two partners, strikes and lock-outs are valued 
only as potential threats in thè search for a point of 
equilibrium which will be reached without these strikes and 
lock-outs actually taking place.
A strike will take place only when, according to Hicks
and Shubik, there is an evaluation error by one of thè parties
in play or if his behavior is irrational.
In line with thè goals of this research, to identify an 
economie model that explains thè progress of strike frequency 
and duration, this approach is not very revealing due to thè
restrictiveness of thè hypothesis.
1.1.2 Development of thè Bargaining Theory
Other developments of game theory which analyze bargaining 
with imperfect or incomplete information seem more interesting.
Perfect information means that whoever participates in 
negotiations knows thè previous moves and also thè chance moves 
of thè partner, while imperfect information means that neither 
previous moves nor any combination of moves are known.
On thè other hand, complete information means that thè 
players know thè rules of thè game and, therefore, also thè 
utility function of thè other player— classic game theory is 
based on this principle— while incomplete information means 
that thè negotiating partners are uncertain about some important 
parameters: information about thè other partner, pay-off
functions, etc.
The difference between imperfect and incomplete information 
roughly recalls thè difference between risk and uncertainty.
In thè first case thè partners know at least "thè objective 
probabilities associated with alternative possible outeomes of 
thè game" and in thè second case "where even some or all of
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these objectives probabilities are not even defined in any 
straightforward sense."^
As has already been mentioned, thè classic game theory
considered negotiations in which rational partners possessed
perfect and complete information and hold strikes only as a
potential threat. A strike could happen only in thè case of
complete but imperfect information, that is thè case in which
thè participant to bargaining behaves as if "he understands thè
nature of expected-utility calculations, and he is able to specify
h i s  p r e f e r e n c e  o r d e r i n g  in C a r d i n a l  ra t h e r  than ordi n a i  terms
and accepts thè implications of expected-utility calculations
(2)with respect to thè phenomenon of risk."
The more recent developments of Bargaining Theory deal 
with games with perfect but incomplete information in which 
thè reaction functions of thè partners are obtained through an 
infinite process of acquisition of information on reciprocai
(3)reactions. Harsanyi, who is perhaps thè most important 
author along these lines, tries to resolve thè impasse of 
infinite regressive process that gives rise to thè determination 
of thè points of concession of thè two partners through thè 
utilization of compound expectations and of stereotype utility 
functions that would assure thè consistency of reciprocai 
expectations.
An ulterior development is represented by thè Bayesian 
game model in which thè partners, even if they do not know or 
are uncertain about important data on thè other partner are 
nevertheless in possession of a probability distribution on thè 
alternative moves of thè other partner, even though this may be 
subjective in origin. Now if these probability distributions
^  A. Schotter and G. Schwòblauer, 1980, p. 484. 
^ O . R .  Yound (ed.), 1975, p. 11.
^ J . R .  Harsanyi, 1962.
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are mutually consistent such that they can be considered as 
deriving from a basic probability distribution on parameters 
unknown to thè partners, one falls back on a particular game 
with complete information, thè Bayesian g a m e . ^
As far as being more representative of thè reai process 
of exchange and acquisition of information that happens between 
thè two negotiating partner, this last branch of Game Theory
as does basically thè entire Game Theory, favors mathematical
. • ( 2) formulation and neglects empirical tests.
On thè other hand, economie literature on strikes favors 
exposing thè econometrie model to empirical verification 
normally achieved as a discussion of hypotheses on thè behavior 
of thè partners, employer and employees, and not as a 
derivation of an analytical model.
The first and perhaps thè most valid example of a union of 
mathematical formulation and successive empirical verification is 
thè Ashenfelter and Johnson m o d e l . (3) Nonetheless, this 
reaches thè objective at thè cost of an important principle of 
thè game theory as presented. In fact, this model, which will 
be presented in detail in thè following paragraph and discussed 
in Chapter Two, is based on perfect and complete information 
unilaterally possessed by thè manager. He is aware of thè 
reaction function of thè workers and his own; therefore, 
he dominates thè bargaining process by choosing thè claims
«
(1)J.R. Harsanyi, 1967, 1968.
(2)Though it is necessary to remember that B. Rustem and 
K. Velupillai in their article "A New Approach to thè 
Bargaining Problem," furnish a computerizable version of 
bargaining processes as iterative procedures during which each 
player raodifies his cost and utility functions.
( 3) 0. Ashenfelter and J. Johnson, 1969.
91
and thè optimal strike duration resulting in equilibrium.
1.2 The Ashenfelter and Johnson Model of Bargaining Theory
Within thè Bargaining Theory, thè model presented by 
Ashenfelter and J o h n s o n , ^  confronts three 
participants in labor-management negotiations: management,
trade union leadership, and thè rank and file. These are tied 
to each other by direct or indirect exchange relationships.
Trade union leadership maximizes its objectives of 
survival and growth of thè union and of personal survival of 
thè leader group by satisfying thè expectations of thè base 
(in this model convertible into monetary terms, mostly salary). 
Moreover, in bargaining with management, thè leadership tries 
to maximize thè expectations of thè base in order to obtain, 
in turn, a maximization of consensus— support. When these 
expectations are greater than thè concessions Management is 
willing to negotiate, trade union leadership will try to reduce 
thè expectations of its mexnbers, or if not being successful, 
they must choose between two alternative strategies, sign 
a contract less than thè basic expectations or cali a 
strike.
The first strategy produces discontent at thè base and a 
reduction of support, so thè leadership group will prefer 
thè second. On thè one hand, in fact, this increases thè 
bargaining power of thè trade union with respect to management 
for thè demonstration of strength (capacity to resist and inflict 
direct damages); and on thè other hand, it will reduce thè 
expectations of thè base because of thè resistance shown by 
management and thè immediate loss of salary. (See Figure 1, 
p. 19.)
- 18 -
^ 0 .  Ashenfelter and J. Johnson, 1969.
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Strike Agreement
To satisfy thè expectations of 
members
----------------------------------------------------- ^
Survival and growth of union as 
an institution
^ ---------------------------------------------------
Personal politicai survival of 
leader
Figure 1
; Union ì 
^Rank and File
Derived from: 0. Ashenfelter and J. Johnson, "Bargaining Theory,
Trade Unions, and Industriai Strike Activity," American Economie 
Review, 1969.
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From this essentially politicai model, thè authors analyze 
and formalize thè firm's choice between conceding thè wage 
increase that thè workers consider acceptable at thè expiration 
of thè contract or tolerating a strike to obtain a more 
favorable contract.
The negotiated wage increase, Y , that thè workers 
consider acceptable is defined as proportional to thè absolute 
wage increase, Aw, with respect to thè previous contract
Awage, w.
w
According to thè above reasoning, this depends on thè duration 
of thè strike.
(2) Ya » v(S) .
The authors assume thè relation between wage increase and 
strike duration can be represented by thè following formula:
(3) Ya = Y* + (Yq - Y*)e~TS
where Yq = v(0) represents thè demanded wage increase at 
thè expiration of thè contract and, therefore, is not accompanied 
by strikes; Y* = v(°°) is thè wage increase thè workers are . 
not willing to accept even after a strike of infinite duration, 
and t is thè velocity with which thè workers reduce their 
expectations.
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On thè other hand, thè prof its of thè firm, II, in each 
period, supposing a fixed output produced with thè same technology 
to be sold at thè same price in thè future, will be given by:
(4) n = a P-6 W - H
where P is thè price of goods produced, H thè level of fixed 
production costs, and W thè negotiated wage rate,
(5) W = W(1 + Y )
a
since thè firm wants to maximize thè present value of future 
profits, (V),
00
(6) V = / ne"rtdt.
0
By substituting (3) in (5), (5) in (4), and (4) in (6), and
after thè mathematical steps in resolving for S, thè optimal
strike duration is obtained.
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S = - In
P - PWC1+Y*) 
W(l+ b  <Y - Y*)
From this solution it is deduced that:
-The likelihood of a strike, ceteris paribus, will be greater
(thè partners will be less disposed to come to an
agreement before a conflict occurs) thè greater Yq and t .
-The likelihood of a strike will be less, (thè
partners will be more willing to come to an agreement) thè
greater Y*, minimum acceptable wage increase; r, thè
discount rate of thè firm; P, price of goods produced; and
average product per worker (inversely correlated to thè 
relation between wage-bill and total cost).
Finally, thè authors derived from this analytical model 
an operational version that they tested successfully in thè 
U.S.A. from 1952 to 1967.
The strike probability at time t (St) will be
(7) S! = 8 + & T + 6 Y . + e n*t O 1 2 O t  3 t~l
where T indicates time (in this particular case it is suppos^d 
to be negative according to thè hypothesis of secular decline 
of strikes ^  ). and thè relationship between profit level
and wage-bill, referring to thè previous contract that takes
thè place of thè above-mentioned relation ^ and where YQt
(8) Yot = f( U, f Vi 4Rt.i( n ^ )
(-) (+) (±)
^ S e e  thè thesis on "Secular Decline of Strikes" by P.T. 
Hartman and A.M. Ross, 1960.
S|ca
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depending on U, unemployment rate, R, previous variation of 
thè lagged reai w a g e ^  and on thè profit share.
Substituting, one has:
1+) (-) 1=U (-) (+) (-)
Strike probability defined by thè authors as thè 
number of strikes that begin in a period divided by thè number 
of contracts that expire in that time, is explained in terms 
of reai wage increase (no money illusions exist), of 
unemployment, and of profit share on thè wage bill and is 
tested in thè United States using quarterly data.
P e n c a v e l ^  applies this approach to Great Britain from 
1952 to 1967, obtaining similar results as thè American authors, 
through substituting thè rough data on thè number of strikes 
begun in thè time period for thè probability of beginning a 
strike at thè expiration of thè contract in that period.
The lags were obtained according to thè methodology of 
distributed lags proposed by Shirley Almon based on thè 
polynomial method of Lagrange.
( 2 ) Remember thè symbols:
St = strike probability in time t
AR. = AW. - AP. t t t
AWfc = annual rate of variation of monetary wage 
APfc = annual rate of variation of consumer price
U = unemployment rate
II* = profit level on thè wage-bill
T = in time index (quarterly)
et = disturbance element.
For thè results of thè tests, see thè schematic presentation of 
thè results which follow.
^ j .  Per.cavel, 1970, continues thè analysis by dividing into 
sectors.
(9) s; = A + 6 l vi AR. . + 6 U. + 6 II* , + B T + £. .t 1 . ~ 1 t— 1 ? t <1 t— 1 1 .  t
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Even D. H i b b s t e s t s  this model with satisfying results 
from 1950 to 1969 in ten advanced industriai countries, using 
as a dependent variable thè volume of strikes (frequency x 
duration x extension).
1.3 Operational Versions of Bargaining Theory
As has already been emphasized, most of thè literature on 
conflict that refers to Bargaining Theory as thè interpretive 
paradigm of strikes favors thè econometrie model to be applied 
to empirical tests.
Authors generally follow two lines of reasoning, either 
they reconstruct thè Ashenfelter and Johnson model and propose 
an alternative version or application to a different context, 
or they directly construct an operational model on hypotheses 
of thè behavior of bargaining partners.
In this section, I would like to illustrate those which, 
in my opinion, are thè best examples of thè second line of 
reasoning. I will then offer a schematic presentation showing 
thè results of thè regressions from some of thè most 
interesting articles on this subject, and conclude with comments 
on thè variables used in thè tests.
1.3.1 The Davies Model
The model developed by Davies in his 1979 articles seems 
to be thè best example of a direct approach to thè operational 
version for thè particular clarity and coherency of thè author's 
presentation.
(1)D. Hibbs, 1976.
(2) For further explanation cfr. Appendix. Limits of Statistic 
Sources on Strikes.
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He states his desire to explain "thè time series profile 
of aggregate strike frequency in terms of variety of macro- 
economic v a r i a b l e s ^
He also states that only work conflicts on wages of a
( 2)direct monetary xmplicatxon will be considered, that three 
partners participate in bargaining— management, trade union 
and worker base— and that bargaining takes place under uncertain 
conditions and in an environment of imperfect information.
Management Trade Union and Workers
In fact, thè author assumes that during negotiations begun at 
time t, thè two partners exchange information beginning with 
thè respective trade union wage claims Y ^ and management
wage offers which already allow for identifying a certain
^ R . J .  Davies, 1979, p. 205.
(2) This specification is extremely important because it is 
coherent with thè econometrie equation that will be tested 
using only pay-strikes.
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interval within which a final accord should fall. Concessions
will be made until their expected cost will be less than thè cost
of a strike. Taking thè first graph into consideration, thè
employer will be willing to make concessions if ot(W), his
subjective estimate of thè cost of conceding wage increases
above thè initial offer of Z .— understood in terms ofot
production cost increase and a weakening of his position in
future negotiations— be less than B(S), his subjective
estimate of cost in terms of a strike necessary in order to
make thè workers accept a wage increase less than that initially
demanded, Y , .ot
By thè same token, thè trade union and thè workers will be 
willing to reduce their demands if y(W) thè cost of an 
agreement less than Y — in terms of lower wages, lower future
bargaining power and less support from thè base— is greater 
than their estimate <j>(S) of thè cost in terms of strikes 
necessary to obtain from thè employer salary increases above 
thè initial ones ZOt
Evidently, thè two partners, as they gather more informa­
tion during negotiations, continuously revise their initial 
estimates. It may be deduced that thè strike proba­
bility P(S) at time t will depend on thè distance between 
thè offer and thè wage demand and thè respective propensities 
of thè bargaining partners to make concessions,
P(S) = a{(Yot- zot), bet, bwt)
be^ represents thè attitude of thè employer and
bwt that of thè trade union to bargain,
and will be greater, thè greater thè distance between thè two 
positions of thè partners (a^ > 0) and will be smaller thè
more they are willing to reach an accord (a , a < 0).
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The author then goes on to identify thè relationships 
and thus thè proxies of thè variables above, 
arriving at an operational equation to be
subject to empirical test. In fact, it can be imagined that 
thè wage increase demanded by thè workers Y ^ varies in
thè same way as thè degree of excess demand in thè labor
" smarket, as thè expected rate of price increase P^ _, as thè
• 0expected workers' wage W^ ., and as thè profit level JI^..
In this way a procyclic hypothesis of strikes is included 
for which in periods of expansion characterized by an increase 
in production, prices, profits, and expectations, there is an 
increase in claims.
Yot = 6 <xt- *%■ "t' Jt> 6 > 0
where wage expectations are thè result of thè "going rate" of 
wage contracts (W°_j) and of thè recent erosion of workers' 
income by taxes (R^).
W® = (f>{W°_y Rt > * > 0.
The next step in specifying thè model consists of 
discussing thè manager's wage equation zot* Moreover, it
will be influenced by thè same variables that condition 
workers' claims, even though in an opposite way. For 
example, price rises push workers to ask for 
an increase in income to maintain their purchasing power 
Constant, and alternatively, make it easier for 
management to transfer thè new costs onto thè price of thè 
Products and not increase thè incidence of strikes.
The last phase of thè model is to specify thè economie 
determinants of thè respective propensities of thè manager

bet, and of thè trade union and workers, bw t ' to bargaining.
y < 0 .2
The employer will be more willing to meet workers' claims 
thè higher his profit margin (11^ ) and thè larger thè expansion 
phase of thè business cycle (X^); while, on thè other hand, 
he will prefer to resist those claims thè greater his stock of 
Products (I ).
As far as thè labor base is concerned, thè workers will 
be able to go on strike if they have thè financial ability to 
do so, that is if occasionai work is available, if they have 
accumulated economie resources, and if they are not subject to 
expenditure commitments. Their willingness to negotiate 
(bwt) will vary in a procyclic sense (Xt) and according to 
seasonal terms (Yt).
The behavior of trade union leadership in negotiations 
will be influenced by thè available financial resources of thè 
union which, however, do not directly imply a greater or lesser 
willingness to negotiate because it also is influenced by 
type of organization (D^ .) .
Trade union militancy will constitute thè last limit M t .
V > 0, ip ^ 0 1 2 '■
Y = seasonal dummy
0, X  < 0
2
Substituting:
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P(s)t = a{xt,P^w°_.,Rt ,nt ,it,yt,Dt ,Mt}
a ,  a ,  a ,  a ^ 0 a , a , a , a > 0  a < 0 .
1 3 5 8 ^  2 1 * 6 9  7
Adding a dummy variable for thè incoine politics (hard, 
soft, entry) and thè element of error, and using thè number of 
wage strikes as a dependent variable, this model was 
successfully subject to empirical verification in thè U.K. 
from 1966 to 1975.(1)
The merit of this version of thè Bargaining theory model 
lies in having clarified that thè economie variables used in 
interpreting conflict refer only to wage strikes, in having 
emphasized thè continuous process of information acquisition 
and of subsequent revision of final offers and demands of thè 
two partners, and in having attempted, by introducing thè 
propensities of thè partners to bargaining, to render thè model 
more manageable.
1.3.2 Schematic Presentation of Some Operational Versions 
of thè Bargaining Theory Model
An attempt has been made to summarize and schematically 
present about twenty ecpnometric tests on thè development of 
strikes.
Reported in thè charts are:
— in thè first column, thè author's name and bibliographic 
reference of thè article examined;
— in thè second column, thè country or countries examined in 
thè test and thè time period in which empirical verification 
was applied;
^ F o r  thè test results, see thè Section 1.3.2.
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— then, thè sectors under consideration, if thè entire 
economy has been examined or if some sectors have been 
excluded or only a few considered;
— thè strike measure on which thè regression was made, number 
of strikes, hours lost, workers participating, and thè 
periodicity (annually, quarterly, etc.);
— then thè explicative variables represented by thè most
•
standard symbols in current literature; for example, P 
represents price variations, with thè signs + or - if thè 
variable is significant, otherwise thè symbol (o) next to 
thè variable if it has not proved to be significant;
—  finally, thè coefficient of determination (JR2 ) and thè 
D.W. test of out-correlation òf thè residuals.
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L e g e n d ^
U = unemployment rate,
W = wage,
reai W = change of reai wage,
money W = change of money wage,
P = change of consumption prices, 
net profit 
gross profit
capitai stock = change of capitai stocks,
% women = proportion of women in thè labor force,
% payment result = proportion of workers, paid by results schemes,
•W diff. ind = change in thè wage differentials between 
industries,
W diff. region = change in thè wage differentials 
between regions, 
plant size 
firm size
productivity = change in productivity, 
concentration = industriai concentration rate,
% skilled workers = proportion of skilled workers on thè employees, 
E = employees,
W^on-going = on-going wage rate,
T.U. organization = financial power of thè Trade Unions,
T.U. members = proportion of T.U.'s members,
Hard I.P. = Hard Income Policy,
Soft I.P. = Soft Income Policy,
RE-entry = end of income policy,
P.P. = party of president,
% Dem. seats = percentage of Democratic seats in Congress.
^^The legend follows thè order in which thè variables appear 
in thè following schematic tables. The index subt maintains
for each variable thè contemporaneity or thè lag in which it is 
used.
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1.3.3. Comment on thè Variables Used in thè Tests
I will try to tie together this fragmentary presentation 
of thè operational versions used to interpret thè progress of 
strike phenomena by synthesizing thè numerous independent 
variables used in thè econometrie formulations of thè models.
They may be categorized into five groups:
Economie Variables in which we can have different 
combinations of variations of reai wage levels, discretionary 
income, prices, unemployment, productivity, capitai stock, 
variations of reai or monetary profit (net or gross), 
unemployment rate, rate of fiscal imposition, at time t or 
lagged by a year, half-yearly, or quarterly.
Political-Organizational Variables which can range 
from a simple dummy variable for labor, government, election 
year, for thè type of negotiations (centralized, decentralized, 
etc.), thè presence of income policy or of a repressive 
legislation in force, until arriving at a rate of unionization 
or of a variation in that rate, to thè number of voters 
for leftist parties, to thè number of deputies from leftist 
or rightist parties.
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Structural Variables used above all in intersectorial 
analysis such as percentage of women employed, of administrative, 
clerical, technical workers, of workers paid by result schemes 
to thè total number employed, rate of industriai concentration.
Emulational or Environmental Variables used both in 
intersectorial and global analysis, made up of politicai 
strikes, strikes in another sector, usually leader or particular 
(e.g., in U.K., thè mining and quarrying sector), and used 
finally with a one-year lag or with quarterly averaged lags.
Temporal Variables such as time normally used to sub- 
stitute change in employment, labor force, technological change 
and other factors with an assumed linear progress, and 
seasonal dummy variables inserted to account for thè seasonality 
of employment, of thè termination of production cycles 
and family budget payments.
This variety of types of variables is in some cases 
explained by an attempt by some authors (Snyder, Hibbs, Cella) 
to test, with thè same equation, thè validity of thè bargaining 
and political-organization paradigms and in other cases, even 
though a bargaining model, usually that of Ashenfelter and 
Johnson, is referred to directly, by thè desire (or necessity) 
to consider other variables in order to improve thè 
econometrie test.
At this point, I would like to make a few comments on 
Cronin's a p p r o a c h , ^  defined by thè author as historical. He
^ J .  Cronin, 1979.
Economie variables: GDP, ut , Rfc, Rt-1' Pt' Prod*
Politicai variables: Labour Government, Conservative Govern­
ment, Liberal Government, Wartime Coalition, Election Year, 
no. Conservative MP's, Repressive Legislation in Force. 
Organizational, Emulative Variables: T.U. Members,
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considers 19 variables: seven economie, seven politicai, four
organizational or emulative, plus thè time variable. Using 
thè stepwise procedure, he selects thè seven that have thè most 
explicative power. This type of analyses, realized in a very 
long period from 1893 to 1974 and for subperiods 1893-1913, 
1893-1921, 1919-38, 1946-74, leads to interpretations of thè 
conflict phenomenon that use different variables from time 
to time. In other words, it consists of having for each case, 
for each time period, and for each economie sector considered, 
an ad hoc model that certainly is more consistent with thè 
reai situation of thè moment and allows for better testing of 
thè equations, but in lacking a point of reference, does 
not permit an identification of thè fundamental determinants 
of industriai phenomena.
And it is exactly with this idea in mind, identifying 
thè determinants of industriai conflict, that we will now 
confront criticisms of thè theoretical bargaining model.
1.4 Criticisms of thè Bargaining Theory
I would like to conclude this chapter on Bargaining Theory 
with some criticai considerations. Some fundamental limits 
of thè model refer to thè universe to which it is applicable.
1. In thè model, negotiations between Management and
Trade Unions, ^  within which strike action is legitimized,
( 2 )takes place in industriai sectors m  which Management obeys 
thè rules of maximizing future profit stream. This analysis,
Fn. continued
T.U. growth, strikers in miningt_1 , strikes in all 
time except miningt_^.
^ T r a d e  Unions or workers.
^ M a n a g e m e n t  includes also thè interests of thè owners or 
stockholders.
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then, does not cover conflicts that take place in public firms, 
in which management1s logie theoretically follows other criteria, 
for example, employment, development, etc., which in reality 
present large deficits in thè budget. Furthermore, thè 
tertiary sector does not enter thè pieture. This lacuna, 
especially after thè end of thè 1960's with thè beginning and 
increase of work conflict in thè public and private tertiary 
sector, annuls thè interpretive and predictive value of thè 
model.
Cfr. in Italy thè increase in thè number of strikes in 
thè commercial sector: 38 in 1967; 68 in 1968; 115 in 1969;
155 in 1970; 168 in 1971; 188 in 1972; thè number of workers 
participating respectively: 24; 112; 284; 152; 73; and 63;
and thè number of days of work lost: 312; 1435; 4568; 5254;
1134.
2. Moreover, thè same analysis of bargaining as formulated 
can be applied only to unionized economie sectors and a strike 
can only be realized after a first contact between thè two 
parties in dialogue ending without success. It 
excludes examination of non-unionized sectors and also all 
forms of strikes that are separate from direct contact at thè 
moment of negotiation, be they patronized by thè Trade Union 
or spontaneously initiated by thè worker rank and file.
If thè limit of unionization of thè sectors can be con- 
tested by demonstrating that areas of complete non-unionization 
do not exist, but only some professions in which thè union is 
less strong, then it will be more difficult to deny thè 
importance of thè phenomenon of unofficial strikes and of 
strikes which subsequently coincided with union movements, 
especially after 1968. As thè Donovan Report points out, 
there is an effective underdimensioning of officiai union 
structure from which thè managing of workers' claims escaped.
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3. It is exactly in thè theme of claims that thè other 
gross limitation of thè model exists. It considers only wage 
claims and therefore can refer only to wage strikes. As 
has already been stated (cf. Introduction), this limitation 
often results in improper use of thè model, using independent 
variables explicative of wage claims for interpreting con- 
flicts that are not only about wages. Notwithstanding thè 
already considered unreliability of statistics on strikes 
divided by cause, I would like to note that, for example, in 
thè U.K. thè number of disputes concerning employment rose from 
234 in 1965 to 451 in 1971, thè number of workers participating 
in such disputes was 49,50 0 in 1963 and 112,80 0 in 1971, and 
thè days lost 141,000 in 1963 and 1,397,000 in 1972.
Generally, however, thè increase in unemployment 
rate in thè U.K. from 1.40 in 1966 to 5.70 in 1977, in Italy 
from 4.40 in 1970 to 7.20 in 1978, and in France from 1.1 in 
1969 to 5.3 in 1978, sharpened thè sensitivity of thè workers 
to job security and initiated a series of conflicts to 
protect workers' rights and to defend jobs, which certainly 
cannot be explained by a model of wage claims.
4. Moreover, there is a global perplexity about thè 
bargaining m o d e l ^  in regard to its capacity to completely 
represent thè European bargaining system. This limitation 
can be attributed to thè more frequent presence of a
third partner, government, at thè bargaining table. In fact, 
thè government is called to intervene daily in labor relations 
with financings/fiscal tax reductions, or even rescues 
(financial bail-outs); and takes an active role in negotiations,
This perplexity is clearly brought out by Snyder who, 
for this reason, gives a residuai role to thè model in 
interpreting conflicts.
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organizing trilateral encounters or institutionalizing forms 
of cooperation (German concerted action). Otherwise, one 
could respond with thè legitimate doubt about Bargaining 
Theory by saying that thè determination of wages does not come 
from negotiations between Management, Trade Union and Govern­
ment, but is instead determined monopolistically by thè Trade
Union as F a r b e r ^  points out as happening in thè mining 
sector. In thè last case, thè global approach model is put 
under discussion because strikes would not have any reason 
to occur in relation to bargaining.
The internai ties between thè variables of thè model will 
now be examined.
5. A basic ambiguity exists in thè model, thè construction 
of which is implicitly based on procyclic characteristics of 
strikes and presumes a regressive power of unemployment and a 
propulsive power of price increases.
On thè one hand, price increases push workers to strike
(2)in order to re-establxsh thexr reai purchasxng power, 
inflation, therefore, stimulates strikes. On thè other hand, 
unemployment taken as a proxy for thè economie cycle and 
as an indicator of bargaining strength sugeests a negative 
link to thè industriai conflict.
In other words, thè model implicitly presumes through thè 
effect on strikes, a negative relationship between price 
variations and employment variations of thè Phillips' curve 
type.
The moment thè very theory of thè Phillips' curve is ques— 
tioned why both price rises (two-digit inflation) and
(1)H. Farber, 1973.
(2) .Workers suffer no money illusion.

-  43 -
unemployment increases, and new theoretical pictures 
for interpretation are sought (for example, thè theory of 
partial equilibrium), thè conflict model registers 
this inadequacy.
And being faced contemporaneously with more strikes, 
higher inflation, and more unemployment creates thè need, in 
this context also, to explore new ways to resolve thè problem.
6. Furthermore, changes have occurred in thè 
income level considered thè right
of thè workers, YQ , in their willingness to negotiate,
and in their subject perceptions of thè cost of a strike (t) 
and that these have fed thè threat of conflict.
These changes can be a product of various components:
— there is no longer any willingness on
thè part of thè Trade Union to reduce thè use of strikes as a 
threat (also because by now it causes little fear) by now 
limited only by thè reaction of public opinion;
— thè conflict potential of thè workers is 
never annulled because thè wage increases that thè workers 
obtain do not allow them to reach that level of income which 
they maintain satisfactory, entitlement effect.
— Additionally, thè search for an auxiliary source 
of income, that if it can theoretically reduce thè workers' 
sensitivity to increase in primary wages, will increase his 
sensitivity to thè increase in time dedicated to thè second job, 
and in thè end is a cause of greater conflict (strikes, late- 
ness, sickness, etc.).
— Finally, thè sensitivity of thè workers to net loss of 
income during a strike which constituted (according to Hicks) 
thè limit of thè continuation of conflict until obtaining 
thè objective, is notably reduced because of thè more frequent 
presence of entries into thè family budget, not of least
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importance marginai works, and also because of thè wide 
practice of alternating sick-days and vacation leave with 
strike days (striking at thè expense of thè firm).
7. I would like to end this chapter considering a more 
specific limitation of thè operational version of thè 
bargaining model that looks upon chosen measures as conflict 
indicators.
As is well known, there are three simple indexes of 
conflict (relative number of strikes, of strikers, of days 
lost) and four composite indexes (thè dimensions which repre- 
sents thè average number of workers participating in thè 
strike, thè d u r a t i o n ^  that represents thè average number of 
days lost for each striker, thè gravity of thè strike which 
represents thè average number of days lost per strike, and 
thè volume which is thè product of thè relative number of 
strikes and thè dimension and thè duration) but in thè tests 
of thè model thè number of strikes or, alternatively, thè 
volume of strikes is used. Leaving aside thè pluridimensionality 
of thè phenomenon is reductive, especially if it is not 
motivated by a particular interpretation of thè Bargaining 
Theory model.
(1)According to thè classic terminology used by D. Hibbs.

CHAPTER TWO
Development of a Broader Bargaining Model 
(M athem atical Version)

In this chapter, I v/ill try to outline a model v/ithin 
thè bargaining process, and despite thè weakness already 
specified in thè previous chapter, attempt to overcome some 
larger stumbling blocks.
I v/ill begin, therefore, by defining thè framework 
within which thè model wili be developed. First, it 
must be remembered that in thè context of thè Bargaining 
Theory strikes are interpreted above all with reference 
to thè economie system. The analysis deals with 
thè cost-benefits that v/ork produces for each partner, 
in contrast to other interpretations which analyse in­
dustriai conflicts through their politicai connotations, 
thereby reducing thè factory to a site v/he re thè struggle 
for politicai takes place.
2.1.1 V/ithin thè Llmits of thè Bargaining Theory
First I will try to summarize thè limits of thè 
f
bargaining model.
1. The strike potentially takes form only at thè moment 
in which negotiations are opened and can only occur after 
thè fallure of a first initiative to reach an agreement.
This would exclude all strikes that do not take place 
concurrently v/ith thè termination of a contract and those 
that are held even before negotiations are initiated in 
order to demonstrate thè strength of labour. One hypo— 
thesis which would overcome this limitation in thè model
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would be a contlnuous readiness to negotiate on thè parts 
of thè management and thè trade unions. Using this hy- 
pothesis, thè model could be extended to all strikes which 
do not take place following initial negotiations since 
such strikes would be interpreted as thè result of an 
implicit and unsuccessful mediation.
2. The relationship between trade union leadership 
and trade union rank and file has hardly been explored.
For example, questions such as: who calls thè strike 
and who decides what objectives to emphasi.ze, are stili 
to be answered. This ambiguity between leadership and 
rank and file is emphasized by thè spontaneous strikes 
which often are not recognized by thè trade union 
leadership. There is one possible loophole in this 
view: following thè tendency of deeentraiization of col­
lective bargaining, thè unit of bar mainino: has become 
smaller resultine in an exchange of roles. This has come 
about mainly through thè increasing importance of shop- 
stewards, factory delegates, and locai factory meetings 
in thè decision-making process. Thus, thè dichotorr.y be­
tween union leadership and rank and file diminishes and 
objectives that both want to reach,tend to be thè same.
3. Moreover, in my analysis, I would have liked to 
have covered every economie sector, agriculture, 
industry, and especially services because of its increasing 
importance in thè conflictual arena. However, I will limit 
my mathematic and econometrie formulation to thè industriai 
manufacturing sector. This will allow an internai con- 
sistency between theoretical application and operational 
methods. I v/ould like to emphasize that this restrictive 
choice must be considered as only a first step towards
a more coherent and complete model.
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4. Last but not least, I v/ill try to overcome restricting 
bargaining to wage claims alone. Together with thè Bar­
gaining Theory model as formulated along thè lines of 
Ashenfelter and Johnson which implies a procyclic strike 
pattern (negatively correlated to thè unemployment rate 
taken as a proxy of thè economie cycle), this type of 
restriction strongly reduces thè applicability and validity 
of thè interpretation of this model. Owing to thè unre- 
liability of statistical Information on strike causes, I 
would propose a theoretical subdivision of thè fundamental 
motives for conflict. This, in my opinion, could be en- 
visaged in two broad categories: wage claims and employ- 
ment claims (understood above all in defensive terms, to 
safeguard thè workers' position).
Within these tv/o categories can be included all strikes
for social security, housing, social reform, reduction of
thè working day, and job security, all of which can be
viewed by thè employer as an increase in labour's cost
and an increase or impossible reduction of thè work force.
Even though this two-fold distinction is not an exhaustive
one, for example>it ignores a large group of claims such
as those on working conditions, it is a step towards 
increasing thè explicative power of thè model.,
By using this subdivision, it is possible to overcome thè 
impasse created by thè trade-off between price and unem­
ployment through strikes. Thus, it enables us to clear 
thè field of such obstacles as contradictory relationships 
thè variables, ambiguous interpretations of thè 
strike, and possible irrationalities in thè logie of thè 
claim mechanism of trade unions.
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2.1.2 A Search for Trade Union Rationality
Keeping in mind this two-fold distinction, I would 
like to analyze thè rationality of strikes on thè assump- 
tion of a positive link between wage claims and thè phases 
of thè economie cycle.
In fact, thè available literature has already proven 
a negative correlation between excess demand and strike 
increase (for wage increases), using as a proxy for excess 
denand thè unemployment rate. Therefore, it would be 
irrational (and inconsistent with thè above) to find claims 
for higher wages in periods of declining demand or increasing 
unemployment, as at thè present moment.
I would therefore organize thè rationale for strikes 
into sectors along thè following guidelines:
1. in a sector in expansion with increasing demand 
(measured for instance by thè number of positions 
offered and stili available) and near full enploy- 
ment, strikes occur for wage claims (1).
2. in a sector in expansion or not in decline, strikes 
can occur to anticipate thè risk of thè worker 
being laid off, thereby increasing job security, 
but reducing job mobility.
3. in such a sector, even if thè production is not 
increasing, thè situation becomes similar to full 
employment (thè employers cannot dismiss any workers) 
and strikes claiming wage increases are rational.
(1) This type of analysis should be conducted at thè 
firm level; however, thè relative data is not available 
as well as thè tool to manage thè intercorrelations at 
that level. Therefore, thè analysis will be conducted 
at thè sectorial level, even though some fiiìns are ex- 
panding while others in thè same economie branch are in
decline.
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4» in addition, sympathetic strikes can
occur in one sector for thè unemployment of another 
segment of thè labour force. Trade unions often 
consider themselves' representati ve of thè workers 
as a whole so they can pròtest in a strong sector 
in favor of another which does not have blackmail 
power, for instanee thè unemployed or thè young 
in search of a first job.
5. in a declining sector strikes occur to protect 
jobs and to oppose thè lay-off risk.
As can be seen, it is not my intention to subdivide 
strike data and thè multiplicitv of motives for striking 
and in such a way to speak only of wage strikes or em- 
ployment strikes. It is my intention
to widen thè causes included in our approach in order to 
better understand strike rationale and strike pattems. (1) 
I v/ill examine strike data as a whole in an attempt to 
clarify possibilities of conflict and thè ties with eco­
nomie variables, especially thos<? whose origins lie in 
thè present economie situation which developed after thè 
oil price increase in 1973 and thè perverse combination 
of inflation and depressed generai demand.
2.1.3 Clarifyins Ideas with thè Kolt Labour
Market Se he me
The Holt Scheme can be helpful for understanding 
thè various relationships v/ithin thè labour market.
Reducing these relationships to stock-flow helps to under-
(1) The reai determination of thè cause of a strike 
is through ad-hoc analysis for each strike using inter- 
views v/ith workers and exar.ining strike documents.
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line how thè union creates new ties and changes them. 
This model analyzes labor market d o s e  to stochastic 
equilibrium in which thè stock of vacancies and 
unemployed workers is nearly Constant, re-establishing 
itself after short periods of imbalance because of thè 
almost equal rates of gross inflows and outflows (see 
Fig. 1).
Figure 1. Laboc-nurket schema tic.
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From thè stock of employed workers comes thè flux of 
retirees, layoffs, and quits. All of these, with thè 
exception of thè retirees who return to thè family, go into 
thè stock of unemployed workers. Furthermore, there is 
a flow of employed workers who go directly from one job 
to another. On thè other hand, production creates new jobs 
which enlarge thè stock of vacancies; and, this in relation 
to unemployed workers, produces recalls and hires.
Family ties contribute to two flows, one into and thè 
other out of thè labour force.
For example, a sudden rise in production would 
generate a need for additional workers and, thereby 
raising thè number of vacancies. With thè increase in thè 
stock of vacancies, there is an increase in thè probability 
of worker-job matches resulting in new hires. This has a 
counter-effect on thè increase in vacancies, reduces thè 
stock of unemployed workers, and increases thè average 
duration of vacancies while decreasing that of unemployment. 
Also some employed workers would tend to leave their jobs 
(more quits), thus creating vacancies and increasing 
unemployment. With thè greater probability of worker-job 
matches, part of these increases will be re-absorbed 
while firms will reduce thè layoffs (due to thè greater 
number of quits). Other workers will be attracted 
to thè labour market, constituting a new labour force and 
thereby re-establishing thè equilibrium.
The total turnover flow, thè sum of quit and layoff flows, 
is considered to be nearly Constant. In fact, when thè ratio 
of vacancies to unemployed rises, thè number of quits 
increases. When thè ratio decreases, thè number of layoffs 
rises.
The author draws from this model several interesting
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implications for wage changes which we cannot now c o n s i d e r . ^  
Instead, thè reduction of demand, which is not treated in 
thè articles, and thè introduction of trade union action will 
be developed in detail.
In a period of reduction of global demand, when employers 
find themselves with an excess of workers, thè flux of layoffs 
and retirements (early retirements) increases while thè 
search for better positions by already employed workers 
declines, At thè same time, thè number of vacancies declines, 
and thè probability of worker-job matches. Some of thè 
labour force will leave thè market (women and thè elderly).
Nevertheless, thè possibility of re-establishing thè 
preceding equilibrium which was abandoned, seems to be more 
difficult than in thè before-mentioned case of expansion.
Will thè number of unemployed workers who, being discouraged, 
are willing to leave thè labour market be enough to re- 
establish equilibrium?
For thè moment, we will defer this question and, 
instead examine what effect thè introduction of trade union 
activity could have on such a model.
According to Holt, in periods of expansion, thè individuai 
threat of quitting is mrre important than thè collective one, 
striking. In fact, for thè finn in periods of full 
employment thè cost-risk of quits is
See also thè interesting macroeconomic approach in 
which thè author tries to derive a function for employment 
demand based on both salary and thè index of job avail- 
ability (V/U) and vacancies, in its turn a function of 
thè two preceding variables. The infinitely possible 
combinations of these functions lead to a solution as an 
indeterminate equilibrium. (Holt, C., 1980).

- 53 -
greater than that of strikes. (1) In these periods, thè 
employer is willing to concede wage increases for all 
workers, so thè difference between union and non-
unioii wages decreases. It is precisely for this reason 
that, in order to re-establish thè margin between union 
and non-union wages (or where this problem of wage dif- 
ferences does not exist, as is often thè case in Europe 
because of a greater contractual power of thè trade union) 
thè trade union increases thè number of strikes. Yet, 
in periods of expansion, thè stocks and flows of thè Holt 
labour market scheme are not influenced by trade union 
intervention.
V/nen global demand dee 1 ines, when thè stock 
of vacancies does not grow because of new flows, thè 
stock of unemployed workers increases, and at thè same 
time thè probability of worker-job matches is reduced, 
thè trade union, according to Holt, sees thè collective 
threat gain power over thè individuai threat. So thè 
trade union does not increase thè number of strikes, 
because thè wage differencial is re-established.
At this point, an ulterior motive for wage claims
( 1 )
Cost Cost
Costs of strikes and quits Collective Bargaining advan-
to company, union, and workers tage over Individuai
Bargaining
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can be introduced to maintain employment.
Two different scenarios can be imagined.
Scenario A
Given a decline in global demand with its consequen- 
tial reduction of vacancies and increase in unemployment, 
thè trade union does not feel strong enough, is divided 
by individuai interests, or perhaps is involved in direct 
management of thè economy. It does not begin a 
series of strikes (usually well-attended and of long 
duration) to defend employment. In this way, thè niobi li ty 
of workers, thè turnover rate, is left unaltered.
Scenario B
In this second situation (Fig. 2), thè sane economie 
conditions are given as in thè first: decline in global 
demand, reduction of vacancies, and increase in unemploy­
ment (which could be made up primarily of thè young in 
search of a first job). The trade union, however, has 
a more agressive behaviour and calls for strikes, usually 
long and well-attended, to prevent layoffs, in this way 
re'ducing thè turnover rate. General unemployment being 
high, employed workers do not look for better job possi- 
bilities (less quits) and, at thè same time, thè trade 
union forces some firms to keep an overload of workers, 
labour hoarding.
According to thè author, even if thè voluntary re­
duction of thè labour force would bring a marginai re­
duction in unemployment, equillibrium would not be re- 
established because a key mechanism is blocked, that is, 
turnover.
The stock of unemployed is partly reduced because 
of those who go back to thè family, mainly thè young in 
search of a first job and marginai workers whose unique 
situation makes it difficult for them to leave thè labour

PRODUCTION
DEMAND FOR LABOR SERVICES
Figure 2, SCENARIO B
ì$
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market but just as difficult to enter it. In fact, thè 
number of vacancies remains low, as is thè probability 
of being hired for one of thè unemployed workers who is 
either unqualified or a layoff from a decling sector and, 
therefore, qualified but in an area not required by thè 
labour market. The market, therefore, could settle with 
an excess of employed workers (labour hoarding) due to 
labour disputes and with an excess of unemployed without 
being able to re-establish thè initial equillibrium until 
thè trade union can utilize its power threat.
It is not thè intention of this paper to continue 
with an analysis of thè labour market, but with thè various 
possible trade union actions.
The two scenarios that were presented above can 
correspond to two types of trade unions in different coun- 
tries and with different systems of industriai relations, 
or to a single trade union that confronts different levels 
of unemployment. Scenario A represents one in which thè 
trade union must confront an unemployment that does not 
directly affect its members, or more genarally speaking, 
of marginai workers.
In thè second scenario , though, thè "core groups" 
are threatened by unemployment; therefore, thè trade 
union calls for a strike, not to maintain thè salary dif- 
ferential, but simply to maintain its very reason to 
exist, that is, its very members. (1)
(1) These strikes can often be demonstrative in 
order to obtain public intervention. In fact, v/hen thè 
number of layoffs rises, thè capacity of thè trade union 
to increase through strikes thè cost of those layoffs for 
thè company is minimal. Qn thè one hand, this is because 
of thè excessively high cost of workers that thè firm is 
no longer willing to support, and, on thè other, because 
of thè limit of thè workers' resistance (as Hickjsustains)
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After this digression on thè labour market and hov; 
thè trade union could intervene, I would like to go back 
to thè Bargaining Theory models with which strikes will 
be interpreted and try to integrate them according to new 
emerging concepts.
Before going into thè development of thè model, I 
will emphasize thè limits of thè approach
used and within which thè analysis will be developed.
2.2 V/ithin thè Limits of thè Ashenfelter and
Johnson Model
The limits, or rather thè fundamental characteristic, 
of thè Ashenfelter and Johnson model consist in thè uni- 
lateral distribution of information possessed by Manage­
ment. (1) It is not thè intention here to resolve this 
limit -directly. In fact, thè model explains a strike 
as a result of thè rational choice of Management (which 
wants to maximize profits) to accept thè raise in wages 
demanded by thè workers, V/a, or to withstand thè cost of 
a strike in order to reduce that demand according to thè 
workers' line' of concessions of which Management is fully 
aware. (2) This limitation is even more important if one
Fn continued
which forces them into not being able to prolong thè strike.
(1) As Kennan (1979) widely emphasizes.
(2) This unilateral manipulation or monopoly of 
information was already present in Hicls1 work. It is 
not further developed here, but used to explain thè strike 
phenomenon; a strike occurs because an employer is inter- 
ested in reducing thè workers* expectations. The only 
way for this to be done is through a strike.
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considers thè frequent strikes— proof of power— that precede 
thè ending of a contract, and thus precede any possible 
managerial decision.
If a Constant willingness on both parts to negotiate is 
imagined, that is, both parties are always seated at thè 
negotiating table, every strike can probably be seen as part 
of thè negotiations potentially begun. The initiative 
of thè trade union may be compared to an intentionally high 
wage demand which is unacceptable to Management. Therefore, 
a strike would only be thè answer to an inevitable refusai 
by Management to concede thè salary increase demanded by thè 
workers. In other words, if Wo is thè line of concessions 
of Management and Wd thè line of concessions of labour, 
then a strike occurring before thè start of negotiations tends 
to reduce thè area of encounter, increasing thè cost of thè 
conflict for thè employer and giving proof of his own power. 
The employer finds himself in thè usuai position, to 
concede increase Wd or to run thè risk of a strike of 
duration n - 1 (see Figure 3) .
W
Figure 3
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The occurrence of these strikes, before thè very start of 
negotiations, also should increase thè workers’ cost and lower 
thè curve of workers' concessions recreating thè old power 
relationship. Nonetheless, it is reasonable to assume that 
they are more likely to happen if thè curve of workers' 
concessions is fiat at thè beginning, that is, when workers 
are very determined and less sensitive to an immediate 
curtailment of their income.
Expressed in graphic foriti (H. Farber, 1968) , thè Ashenfelter 
and Johnson model would mean that, given thè curve of thè 
workers' concessions, thè employer will maximize his profit by 
choosing a strike duration and conceding a wage increase 
compatible with thè highest possible profit level (see Figure 4).
The duration of thè strike is on thè abscissa__ while 
thè wage claims are on thè ordinate. The isoprofit curves, 
decrease in yalue thè further they are from thè origin. The 
workers' concession curve reduces thè wage claims, Wa, 
exponentially in relation to thè duration of thè strike.
Figure 4
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The meeting point between thè workers' concession 
curve and thè graphically lowest isoprofit curve will 
detergine thè largest obtainable profit for thè employer 
and thè optimal strike duration. Nonetheless, this does 
not represent thè best solution because thè employer could 
concede thè same salary increase without a strike, settling 
for a profit curve which is lower graphically but of a 
higher value (for example see Fig. 4: n2 without strike,
n 3 v/i th S ).
In this approach, thè presence or absence of a strike
during negotiations would be determined by thè slope of
thè workers' concession curve and thè profit curve.
In keeping with thè Ashenfelter and Johnson formula
for thè tv/o functions, we have:
- thè workers' concession curve expressed as
V/a = W + ( V/o - V/ ) e“rS 
x  s
v/here thè increase in respect to thè preceding wage v/i 11
varj' from a minimum claim, W , for which labour is willing
to strike even indefinitely, to one that is compatible
.to an agreement without strikes, V/o. The wage claim
decreases with thè duration of thè strike according to
_rsan exponential form of concession rate (e ).
The derivative of S, dUa = _r e-rS(,Jo. _ w , at s , 0
dS x
v/i 11 be dV/ 
dS
S±0
= +r (W - V/o)
- thè profit function11 of thè employer v/i 11 be
n = PQ - w L - H
thè expected future value discounted with thè duration
of thè strisce v/i 11 be
f _ /  4 tv = / PQ - V/L e dt - / H e  dt
S' 0s
The derivative of thè isoprofit curve

3v/ as r i .
-  Tv/~$r} -  - [ p o  -  w l  J V L
that no longer depends on thè strike in point V/ = V/0 is
-  w l  X  ■ -  ">]
0
Analysing these two derivatives, it can be noted that
thè slope of thè workers' concession curve will always
be negative since W Q is defined as always larger than W
which itself could be negative, and that thè slope of thè
isoprofit curve at S = 0 is uncertain depending on thè
workers' wage claims in respect to thè enployer's profits
and so, can be positive or negative, or larger or smaller
t
in absolute value than thè rate of workers' concessions. 
There are four possible situations.
Si tua ti on I
(V/0L - PQ) T/L = r(W^ - U 0)
In this case both thè derivatives are negative and thè 
functions decrease at thè sane rate. V/e, therefore, do 
Wa not have a strike because
it would be more advan- 
tageous for thè employer 
to stop at S = 0.
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Figure 5
Situation II
(t/#L - PQ) T /L < r(V.^ - V/0)
In this case thè negative slope of thè enployer's 
profit will be greater than that of thè workers, and 
therefore, it would be more advantageous for thè employer 
to stop at S = 0 and give thè requested increase to thè 
workers.
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Wa
Situation III A
(W#L - P Q)T /L >  r(Wa - W #)
In this case, thè slope of both functions is negative 
but less for thè profit function which therefore v/ill 
decrease more slov/ly than thè v/orkers' claims. Thus, it
V/a v/ill be better for thè 
employer to v/ait out thè 
duration of thè strike 
which v/ill more quickly 
reduce thè profit expecta- 
tions of thè v/orkers.
Situation IV
(Y/0L - PQ)T /L > r(V,fx - W 0)
Here, there is a profit function with positive deri­
vative and thereby a greater rate of reduction of thè
V/a
S = 0
workers* expectations.
In this case, it is very 
advantageous for thè em­
ployer to allow a strike 
to occur as this v/ill de­
crease thè v/orkers' expec-
Figure 8
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tations much more quickly than it v/ill his profits.
This paper v/ill examine only thè profit functions 
that are subject to thè limits of thè v/orkers' concession 
line and that at S = 0 haye first derivatives greater 
than of equal to zero. There are only cases in which a 
strike contributes to attaining a more favorable agreement 
(not optimal in a Pareto sense), in other words, those
cases in which thè employer at thè beginning of bargaining 
considers a strike of a certain length to be more advan- 
tageous, according to his view of maximizing profit. (l)
2.3 Addine thè Trade Union Demand for Employment 
to thè Ashenfelter and Johnson Model
Utilizing thè formulation of thè negotiating process 
as found in thè Ashenfelter and Johnson model, a wider 
interpretation of strikes will be sought, 
which includes v/orkers' employment claims as v/e 11 as 
wage claims v/ithin thè theme of bargaining itself.
This vrill be accomplished in stages by first seeing 
how thè Ashenfelter and Johnson model can be reformulated 
v/ithin thè area of employment demands and then within thè 
entire area of labour claims (that is, employment demands 
and wage claims combined in a single line of Trade Union 
concessions) and finally in a more complete and true-to- 
life situation of tv/o distinct claims, v/age and employment, 
that have two different rates of resistance and concession.
^ T h i s  restriction, very rational from an economie point 
of view, will prove to be extremely useful in mathematical 
formulations, allov/ing a simplification of results.

2.3.1 First Stage:
Only Rmployment is Negotiated
The first step to inserting employment in thè 
Ashenfelter and Johnson model is to consider only nego- 
L tiations for employmentCl
demands, with v/ages at 
a fixed rate and at 
thè same time allowing thè 
firn to vary its desired 
level of employment and 
thè trade union to push 
for additional employment
demands. V/e find thè workers' line of resistence refers 
to employment demands.
Examining a firn that prodnces a single product, as 
in thè case considered by Ashenfelter and Johnson, and 
supposing that because of technological developnents or 
because of a cri sis in demand, one finds that management 
v/ants to decrease its production. (1)
The profit fune tion would be 
n = Qp _ X v/ - H
where P represents thè price of goods produce, 0 thè 
quantity of thè product, V/ thè workers' salary, A thè 
quantity of work necessary to produce Q goods, and H thè 
fixed costs of production.
Let W be thè fixed salary fo*thè previous contract,
* be thè quanti ty of labour employed v/hich is made up of: 
thè quantity of labour requested by thè firm L(Q) and thè 
employment increase demanded by thè union La(S), function
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(l) The case in which a firm wants to increase its 
production is not taken into consideration given that 
it does not cause trade union clains.
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of thè length of thè strike. when La defined as 
. - Lt.u.(S)La * — L(Q)  profit becomes:
11 = PQ - W L(Q) (1 + La) - H
Negotiations being limited to employment demands, 
thè wage bill can diminish during a strike in relation 
to thè workers' resistance rate, but only as regards thè 
trade union demand for employment (thè shaded area in 
Fig. 10).
W
L(Q) Lt.u. 
Figure 10
The trade union employment demand Lt.u. will consist 
of tv/o parts.
Lt.u. (S) = (L - L(Q) + (U - Umax)) (S) (1)
(1) I have preferred to formulate thè employment 
demand in this way, differing from thè preceding formu­
lation of wage demands which instead refer to thè previous 
contract wage and a proportional increase that is accept­
able to thè workers. The motive is an attempt to simplify 
thè model. Considering L as thè number of employees of 
thè previous contract would have led to a considerable 
complication in formulating thè trade union demand if it 
had already included work hoarding as imposed by thè trade 
union. In fact, if current unemployment U is larger than 
that of thè preceding period 0 and both are greater than 
UMAX, then thè trade union will intervene more forcefully.
U>Ù>UIIAX ===£• trade union intervention 
If on thè other hand U, 0 > UIIAX, but U < 0 > U1IAX ===^. 
thè trade union will try to maintain thè labour hoarding
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The first part is entirely defensive in which an attempt 
is made to maintain thè employment level of thè previous 
contract, L, whenever thè firm would like to reduce it 
for technological or market purposes.
£. - L(Q) exists only for L(Q) ^  £,
The second part is an explicit employment demand which 
reflects, above all, thè probability of unemployment 
and, therefore, is an indicator 0f thè strehgth and com- 
mitment of thè thè union to fight for jobs.
♦ (U - Umax)
This second component is a function of thè 
increase in unemployment U greater than thè maximum accep- 
table rate, UMAX (see Figg. 11-12). In other v/ords, un­
employment can consi st of a con,junc t part for v/hi eh thè 
trade union takes no responsability because it consists 
mainly of unemployed marginai v/orkers, and of a structurai 
part that mobilizes thè union.
The trade union directly intervenes and imposes its 
employment demands when it sees its very work place or its 
members threatened with layoffs. This is when unemploy- 
ment begins to attack thè core groups which occurs when 
thè unemployment rate is above thè acceptable maximum 
(for example, thè maximum unemployment rate of thè previous 
three years).
V/e therefore have a function ^ v/hi eh is not defined
when thè unemployment level is less than or equal to our 
maximum acceptable level when only marginai
rn contmued
£, of thè preceding period or will even be v/illing to re­
duce its pressure on management.
If even thè current unemployment U v/as 4. UMAX<U, 
thè trade union would be willing to give up thè imposed 
level of employment. In thè formulation used here, though, 
each year is independent of thè preceding one.
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Umax
Figure 12
U ^  Umax 4; = 0 (u decreases strikes)
U y Ur.a>: ^ = a(U - U) a >  0 (increases strikes)
if u ^ Umax X - L(Q)

workers are unemployed, which is an increasing
function when thè actual or threatened unemplpyment 
level is above thè acceptable one. Cl)
In thè first case, until thè trade union takes
charge of thè unemployment risk, thè unemployment level 
could have thè effect of reducing thè number of strikes 
as in thè classic model. Strikes would be interpreted 
only as wage claims (less unemployment, more demands for 
wage inerease).
In thè second case, thè trade union could be lead 
to fight for thè employment demand of its members right 
in thè conflictual arena given that a > 0. Logically, 
such a behaviour on thè part of thè trade union presup- 
poses its strength and maturity. In fact, it is unthinkable 
that thè first workers' movements and leagues that fought 
for thè survival of its members v/ere so strong as to be 
able to defend jobs. I believe, however, that in thè per­
iod under consideration, thè last thirty years,
it is reasonable to hypothesize that maturity and power 
have been attained by thè trade union so as to enable it 
to defend a v/ide range of workers' rights.
The labour hoarding that thè trade union seeks to im­
pose on management is reduced in thè strike
duration by ^he cost increase that thè workers are forced 
to accept in abstaining from work, and by thè increase of 
information on thè willingness of thè other partner to 
give in to demands.
Therefore thè employment demand is for:
- 68 -
(1) The trade union, in fact, intervenes above all 
when there is thè threat of layoffs, not so much when 
layoffs have already been made.
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TJ < Umax 0 and
t < L(Q) » 0,
v;ill include only one of thè two parts if one of thè two
components is absent, or if U > Umax and £. > L(0)
results in (L - L(Q) + ^(U - Umax))(S).
Therefore thè profit is:
An explicit solution can be found by determining thè
form of thè workers' resistance curve which may be assumed
-kSin a first approach to be a negative exponential, e , as 
was done for wage claims, and by maximizing thè profit 
funetion.
n = QP - w L(Q) (1 + (£ - L(Q) + (U - Umax) ) (S) L(Q) ) - H
V =  /( PQ-VJLQ(1+- 
S /
OO L-LQ+ ^  (U-U) e 
LQ
-T t
V = (PO - V/LQ( 1 + e-H -t
dV _ x t _—  = -e (PQ-\7LQ(1+' ab
- -TS£-L0 +ip (U-U) kS, e , -kS . ------ rr------  e- ) + - ke
. V/t - LQ + ij> (U-U)
PO-V/LQ = e"kS V/( L-LQ + *(U-U)) ( 1 + r)
- e"TS ke'kS W(L - LQ + * (U - U) ) (1 + £)
d 2Vin thè point in which —  = 0 ^  < 0 and therefore is
a maximum point.
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Solving for optimal S, v/e have
S = -1/k • ln -------- QP ~ ULQ --------OPt — —V/( L-LQ + ip ( U-U) ) ( 1 + K/t )
v/he re
I. S = 0Opt
only if qp _ ~JLQ = w(£_lq + ^ (tj_u))(ì + k/T )
Thus, if thè Manager's profit is equal to thè firm's cost
increase as impcsed by thè trade union multiplied by thè rela
tion of thè respective discount rates.
II. S \ 0opt ^ _
that is, if -------- 9.p...- V 1?---------- y 0
W (ti—LQ (U-U))(l + kA )
k and t being positive, .thè .demominator consisting entirely
of positive elements will also be positive; thè numerator,
thè employer's desired profit, v/ill also be positive
(PQ > WLQ) therefore thè fraction is greater than zero.
' . . - PQ - WLQand if —-------------- —------------ < 1
W( L— LQ + i/;(U-TJ))(l + k/x)
v/hich is thè function of thè variables under con si derat ion :
—  and that is, if PQ - WLQ (management's desired profit)
increases, S decreases, cpt _ ’
—  while if W(£ - LQ + 'f' (U - U)) (additional employ­
ment demanded by thè trade union) increases, S increasesOp t
as a result of a greater profit margin from which thè em­
ployer can draw v/hen conceding employment increases, and 
as a result of greater trade union requests v/hich require 
more time to diminish.
As far as management1s discount rate, t , is concerned, 
thè larger it is, that is thè more thè employer neglects 
thè future in advantage of thè present, thè more he will 
push to rapidly conclude negotiations and therefore make
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S decrease. oPt
On thè other hand, k, thè discount rate of thè workers'
expectations, influences S L in two ways, that is directlyopt
and indirectly within thè denominator of thè frac tion.
Rewriting thè explicit form of thè optimal strike in 
order to simplify thè analysis:
1 Vf(L - LO 4- ♦ (U - Ù))(l + k/T)
°5t “ k PQ - WLQ
and ealling 3 = 1/t a = - L0 ~ * Ì1
PQ -  V/LO
we can rewrite S  ^ = l/k In a(l + 8k) from which isop t
derived three possibilities.
1. « > 1
if a > 1, that is, if thè trade union's claims are 
greater than thè firm's desired profits, S will beCjp u
a decreasing function of k. The faster thè 
workers decrease their expectations, thè shorter will
opt
lim S = 0
-♦+00 cfc tk
lim S 
k -*• 0 
Figure 13
opt ss + co
be thè optimal strike 
duration needed to reach 
an agreement. Viceversa, 
if thè workers' claims 
exceed thè profit wanted 
by thè firm and thè rate 
at which they diminish 
their expectations is 
very small, thè optimal 
strike duration will tend 
toward infinity.
2. ° = 1
if ci s 1 , thè workers* claims equal thè employer's 
desired profits, then thè possibility of reaching an 
agreement will be a function of thè rate at v/hich
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workers' expectations 
diminish and its reduc- 
tion v/i 11 converge tov.-ards 
thè inverse of thè dis­
count rate of management.
lim S = 0 
k- + -ppt
lim S . = S 
k "*0 opt
1
T
Figure 14
3. a 
If
< 1
a< 1, in thè case that thè trade union
is rather reasonable in that it begins negotiations 
asking for less than thè firm's desired profits, there is 
an altemating effect on thè discount rate of workers' • 
expectations. Above all, thè duration of thè strike is
opt positive only for values 
of K above criticai level
*  *  1- ak k =dnr- . For
lim S = 0 i °Ptk + + oo
sopt < 0k -  0
values of K less than K , 
it would be best for man­
agement to immediately 
grant thè requested in- 
creases, which in this 
case is stili lower than 
thè profit, instead of 
waiting for an all-too- 
slow reduction of claims. 
Furthermore, even thoughFigure 15
thè rate of reduction of thè workers' expectations increases,
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in a segment immediately following K*, thè optimal 
duration of a strike will increase until it reaches maximum 
point K(a,B) at which it will begin to decrease.
The examination of this component will help explain 
analytically how a rapid reduction in workers1 expectations 
does not necessarily shorten thè strike; on thè contrary, 
in thè case of a reasonable union (a < 1) it could lengthen 
it in certain segments.
The optimal length of a strike nevertheless remains dominated 
by thè opposite forces of a firm's desired profits, trade union 
demands, and thè tendencies of both to reduce their ambitions.
This approach will not be discussed in depth because it 
presupposes thè possibility of distinguishing between wage 
claims and employment claims and of applying thè model to thè 
case of pure employment claims. This does not actually occur, 
however. Employment claims are often brought forth together 
with wage claims, and, as strike data divided by cause is 
not well-founded, it is more reliable to analyze strikes in 
global terms.
2.3.2 Second Stage:
Negotiating thè Wage Bill as a Whole
The second stage in arriving at a more complete formulation 
consists in taking into consideration thè wage bill made up 
of wage and employment claims that workers and thè union discount 
at thè same global rate. Thus, there is only one line of 
concession which includes various combinations of increases 
in salary and employment.
Also, in this case, thè firm will have a profit function 
to maximize subject to thè constraints of thè concession 
line of workers' demands in terms of wage increases, Wa, 
as well as in terms of an increase or maintenance of employ-
m
Figure 16
ment, La.
Wd(S) = fi V//tv is defined as thè salary increase 
acceptable to thè workers, also called wage demand, where 
is thè wage relative to thè previous contract and is a 
function of thè duration of thè strike. La being thè in­
crease requested by thè union, La(S) = Lt.u./L(Q) which 
is also a function of thè strike's duration.
The firm's profit will then be ^ = qp - v/A - H
and in this case we have:
n = QP - ftL(Q) - ttL(Q) (La + Va+ LaV/a)(S) - H
Substituting for V/a and La and defining thè form of 
thè v/orkers' resistance curve, a clear solution is obtained. 
It is inportant to note that as thè negotiations regard 
both employment and wages, combinations of these tv/o will 
be included in thè area of thè wage bill v/hich undergoes 
negotiation and is therefore capable of shrinking during 
thè strike (see thè shaded area of Fig. 17).
This formulation, even though quite different from 
thè preceding description of thè claims process as including 
two completely separate claims, may be considered a good 
approximation. In fact, in some countries this actually
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Figure 17
occurs; thè union maximizes a wage bill and so, during 
a strike, discount thè combinations of thè two claims.
It is my opinion that thè union's discount rate not 
only varies from country to country or union to union, 
but also, and above all, as regards thè type of claim. 
Keeping environmental data Constant (country, union, eco­
nomie ties) thè rate at which thè union reduces its wage 
expectations will, without a doubt, be different from that 
at which it reduces its employment ones.
Lt .u.
S
Figure 18
For example, it could be ixnagined that in thè case 
of a large company in a period of economie depression, 
thè union, because of thè greater risk of unemployment, 
is very rigid about its employment claims, increasing 
thè cost of layoffs, in order to induce management to
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to settle and to induce government to intervene with 
aide to thè company or with a system of aide for thè 
workers. These claims are quickly reduced when thè two 
possibilities are exhausted.
In thè case of a small company, however, thè workers' 
resistance is, without doubt, less rigid. They do not 
have thè strength to resist a strike and would immediately 
reduce their claims.
Notwithstanding thè fact that some disputes have
developed in thè way just described, there is very little
information on thè reduction of workers' expectations
as regards both wages and employment. Thus, a global
reduction has been presurned, at least in this first phase,
along with a single discount rate which for simplicity's
-ySsake has been assumed to be a negative exponential, e
-vSII = QP - LO (La + V7a + WaLa) e J - H
V = (PO - ttLQ - ftLQ(Wa-+ La + WaLa)e~yS) - H -
-T t
T
—  = -e“T;:)(P0 - tJLQ - fiLQ(l/a + La + WaLa)e“ySdS +
e
T
—YS•y e fiLQ(Wa + La + Wa La)
e~XS( -PQ+ftLQ+ttLQ(V/a+La -WaLa ) e“yS+^?LQ(Wa+La+V/aLa) e yS)
e“TS(-PQ + ttLQ + ftLQ(Wa + La + WaLa)e”yS(l + y/r)
d v
<=>0
dS
m
d^V -t S. _YS= _Te (-PQ + ftLQ + !7LQ(V/a + La + V/aLa)e (1 + y/T)'
dS
-ye“yS(V/a + La + WaLa)tfLQ(l + Y/ )e_TS
dV d2V
ere dS = 0 — 2 < °dS
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The explicit form is obtained for S0pt
e-ys = __________PQ - ftLQ__________
ftLQ(La + V/a + V/aLa)(l + y/T )
Sopt = _i/y • in --------------— --- ----------------  (1)/y ln ffLQ(Wa + La + V/a + La) ( 1 + y A  )
__________________QP - T7LQ_________________
Sopt = -l/y • In
< 1 «tt n f( ^ -LQ^i ( U-U) A V7 £- LQ-hU ( U-U) A V/1U + x )-l q l  lq + lq
(1) In formulating employment claims, a simplification
has been reached by not using thè classic demand for v/age
increase, V/* + (V0 - V/*), v/hich assumes a minimal limit of
salary increase, v/hich could also be negative, beyond v/hich
v/orkers would be willing to strike indefinitely. Intro-
ducing thè version with V7 , thè
minimum increase acceptabfe
to thè v/orkers, would ha ve
imposed a complication of
thè model v/hich at this
point does not seem sig-
nificant. It would have
been necessary, in fact, to
hypothesise on thè rela- LQ Lt. u . tionship between thè var- 
Figure 19 iables V/*, minimum increase,
and ft, thè v/age relative to 
thè preceding contract. Y.’henever V7 is negative, thè sal­
ary for v/hich one would strike would be lower than that of 
thè previous contract. In Figure 19, thè negotiating area 
would no be limited only. to thè shaded area, but could also 
occupy thè area below.
m
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where
X » Sopt = 0
only if QP - V!LQ - T?LQ(V/a + La + V/aLa)(l + y/t ) 
that is, if thè méjnager's desired profit is equal to thè 
increase in thè wage bill proposed by thè union multiplied 
by thè respective discount rates.
II. Sopt > 0 0<QP-WLQ / WLQ (Wa+La+WaLa) (1+y/x) < 1  
where, as in thè preceding case, thè relation v/i 11 be 
greater than sero and v/i 11 vary
- inversely to thè employer1s profit and discount rate
- directly to thè demanded increase in thè wage bill and 
v/ith an altemating line with respect to thè reduction 
rate of thè workers' expectations as regards thè entire 
wage bill, y.
2.3.2 Third Stage : Negotiatin? V/age and Employment
with Tv/o Distinct Demands from thè Trade Union
In this third stage^an attempt will be made to intro­
duce in thè Ashenfelter and Johnson model two seperate 
demands for wage increase and employment. The negotiations 
will revolve around tv/o types of claims that will be re- 
due ed during thè strike at tv/o distinct rates. The em­
ployer will maximize his profit by choosing an optimal 
strike duration and thè most favorable increases v/ithin 
thè limits of thè concession curve.
This approach brings us closer to thè aforenentioned 
negotiating porcess, even though it be v/ith some degree 
of approximation, and also to thè tv/o distinct pattems 
of claims. (1)
(1) In this regard, sce thè latest sociological 
writings, for example thè doctoral thèsis of Sabine 
Erges-Sebin, Paris.
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Graphically, thè shaded area is subject to negotia- 
tion and will diminish according to thè concession and 
resistance rates of thè workers. (1) The case of a one- 
directional reduction can be verified when thè trade unions 
favor employment, for example, and are willing to reduce 
all thè demanded wage increases before beginning to reduce 
employment claims.
L(Q) Lt.u.
Figure 20
This model which represents more a stimulus to further 
development than a final version, will be developed by 
using linear curves of union concession and resistance in 
order to simplify this. first approximation. (2)
The employer's profit will be given, as before, by 
thè function j[ = QP - V/ X- H
v/he re thè v/age will be W = tv + A VJ M( S )
(1) Here 'concession rates' has been used to mean 
thè wage claims and thè resistance rate for employment 
claims. Even if there really is no difference between 
thè two terms, concession rate and resistance rate, thè 
former has been introduced to simplifly thè explanation.
(2) An exponential version has also been worked on, 
but given thè complexity of possible solutions, not expli- 
citly expressed, it is necessary to use a linear model in 
this phase of study.

andAV; reppresents thè union1 s requested wage increasew « U #
and v/ill decrease during thè strike according to thè linear 
function,
iW. (S) = U - l’J rS t.u. 0 0
for rS ^  1
and S 1/r
v/ni le
A V/(S) = 0
S=l/r
for S^i/r
Figure 21
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As far as thè union's employment demand is concemed, 
a slightly reduced model in respect to thè previously pro- 
posed ones has been used.
A = L(0) + L (S) t.u.
L - LQ = AL
Figure 22
v/here L reppresents' only the union1 s defensive em-1 1 u .
ployment claim made up of the difference betv/een employment 
pertaining to the previous contract and that asked for by 
the firm. It v/ill be a function of the v/orkers' expecta­
ti ons.
L (S) = AL - AL S for S £ 1/pw • U»
L. (S) = 0  for S ^ 1/p
u • U *
It is more consistent v/ith the rule and with the reai 
strength of the union's economie blackmail to consider
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thèir action regarding thè threat of layoffs in relation 
to an autonomous employment demand that is mainly of a 
politicai nature.
Thus, thè function ^ , previously described as an 
index of potential worker risk of unemployment, is used. 
This can be a good proxy for thè determination of thè 
union to defend employment and, therefore, its resistance 
rate.
P 1____
(u - u)
Evidently, v/hen LQ £ £ and U 4 Umax, thè em­
ployment component v/i 11 disappear and v/i 11 fall back upon 
thè model presented by Ashenfelter and Johnson of only 
vrage claims.
On thè other hand, under opposite conditions thè
profit v/i 11 be:
n = PQ - (ft +A \! ( S ) ) ( LQ + L (S)) - H"C » VI • t * VI •
v/hich can be rev/ritten: 
n = PQ - ttLQ - (W0 - W orS)LQ - S(Al - ^LPS) -
- (W0 - V/0rS)(AL - ALPS) - H
from v/hich v/e ha ve: 
n = PQ - ftLQ - W eLQ - L - V/0AL - W 0rALpS2 + V/0rSLQ +
+t t ALPS + Wor SAL + W0 ALpS -  H
n = PQ - fT(LQ +A L) - V/0(LQ + AL) - V/0ALrPS2 +
+ (W0r(LQ + AL) + ALp(ft - W0 ) ) S - H
n _ PQ - (t? + l.'0)(LO + AL), + t/„r(LQ + AL) + ALp(ff + V/J, s - - i - g
' .V'/Lr. s2 r
Y
redefinine thè precedine terms in order to simplify thè
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calculation, thè expected profit will be
= J°° (ct+B S -y S2)e“ xtdt - ^ Tl-L - Tt:e dt
-TS -T*
V = (a +3 S -y S ) ----  - H 6T
-TS _ T t
v = (-a -3 S +Y s2) + ----  K
thè first derivative of v/hich is 
H  = e_TS(-a -B S + YS2) + 3 - 2 YS
<7>li S + t(-B - 2 Y / n S + .(-« +S /?).= O a b  c
dV
dS
S
= _a +3 /t £  o <C==> B/t ^ x (1)
O S=0
that is,
x (PO - (fi - V70 ) ( LO + A L)) <  W or(L0 + AL) +A Lp (fi - W 0)
In economie terms, if thè employer's daily profit 
with thè maximum of thè union 's claims discounted according 
to management's expectations \>/ill be less than thè amount 
that thè workers reduce their demands daily —  according 
to their rates r andp —  it v/i 11 be in thè employer's in­
terest not to accept thè workers' claims but to allow a
(1) Precedine imposed limits consider only increasing
profit functions at S = 0.
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strike to occur v/hich v/ill produce, from this point of 
viev/, only relative gains.
On the other hand, it v/ill be in his interest to 
halt the process only when the two terms are equal, that 
is, when each strike day brings in no profit. Proceeding 
now along the lines of thought outlined on page 63 , spec­
ulatine on ® /T . a  second derivative is obtained to 
show that the point in v/hich the first one annuls itself to 
be a maximum point:
d2V - TS,, p— - = e (( +ctx - 28 - 2 y/ t) + ( 4y +8x ) S -yT S )
dS
in point S = 0
= a-T- 26 - 2Y /T ^ -6 _ 2Y / T < 0d2V
dS
S=0
and being at S = 0 dfv
dS2
the second deriv­
ative v/ill certainly be negative, that is, the profit 
function is concave tov/ard the bottom.
The explicit form of Sott. can now be obtained.
2^ /t +8 1 /(_8 _ 2Y /T) - 4Y(-0 +B JT)
S0pt* = ^
The discriminant v/ill be given by:
A = 82 + 4Y2/t2 + 4ya >/^  0 
the value of which depends on the sign and dimension of a :
PQ - (fi + Atf)(LQ + L )
V « U  «
If the wage and employment claims of the union greatly
exceed the value of goods produced and A ^ 0, then the
5 profit function v/ill alv/ays
be negative and it would be 
more advantageous for the 
employer to d o s e  the plant 
as soon as possible.Figure 23
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Excluding then, these cases, t’ne situation where 
A > 0 can be exanined.
Clear information has not been obtained on thè signs 
of workers' claims, which are certainly positive and there­
fore g and y >0» At thè same time, nothing is knov/n 
about thè importanee of claims relative to thè value of 
goods produced.
- If » > 0, that is if thè v/orkers are reasonable and 
leave a certain profit margin to thè employer, thè profit
V function has thè form shown
in Figure 24 in which thè 
maximum will be reached 
at thè first fluctuation.
- If a <0, that is if thè union presents claims that 
are greater than production value, thè profit function
V will first be negative, 
then positive, then again 
negative (Figure 25).
- In fact thè idea that thè tv/o possible radicals be nega­
tive can be excluded, given thè signs of thè terms
V dV
dS , b, and c, and that
thè function could therefore 
have thè form described in 
Figure 26.
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After having analysed thè form of thè profit function, 
we can now examine thè reai solutions thè manager has in 
choosing thè optimal strike duration that v/ould maximize 
his profit.
As has already been emphasized, thè workers' con­
cession line, r, and thè workers' resistance line, p , 
reach a limit beyond v/hich thè workers are not willing 
to strike for S = 1/r, S = 1/ P and in v/hich thè claims 
equal zero.
In other words, thè union and management negotiate 
only thè quota of thè v/age bill v/hich is greater than thè 
previous contract v/age, ft, and thè number of workers, LO, 
which thè employer wants to hire, for v/hich during bargaining 
thè wage bill cannot go below LO * fi; and, there will be 
a strike duration beyond which thè workers no longer re­
duce their claims v/hich corresponds to thè larger of 1/r 
and 1/p , limits of thè concession and resistance curves 
of thè workers* demands.
Since information on thè discount rate of thè workers 
is not available, one can only hypothèsize.
Case A 1/r = 1/p
Supposing thè workers* discount rates to coincide,
Sopt.* to be thè theoretical optimal duration of thè strike, 
derived from thè profit function, and Sott. thè strike 
duration that will be chosen by management.
* 1 1 / c- +^. A i
1. S 0pt* r - p =4- -oPt- = r * p
If Sopt-* exceeds 1/r and 1/p , it v/ould be better for
management to stop at l/r instead of proceeding until
Sopt.*. In fact, after 1/r there are no more workers'
demands, L and A.'/ are equal, and thè reo.1 proxit 
"t • VI «
curve at l/r decreases according to thè discount rate 
of thè employer*s expectations.r ,Figure 27.
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Figure 27
2. Sopt* £ 1/r , 1/p =={v Sopt* = Sopt.
Evidently in this case the theoretical profit curve
coincides with the reai one dV* _ dV and it v/ill there-
dS _ dS
fore be best for the employer to stop at the point of 
maximum profit.
It is necessary to remember that Sopt* < 0 is not 
acceptable for the hypothesis and restrictions that v/ere 
previously nade on the derivative of the profit function. 
Case B l/r £ 1/P
1. Sopt* > max (l/r , l/p) ==£■ min 4 Sopt ^ max.
If thè optimal solution is greater than the maximum of the
reciprocals of the tv/o 
discounts rates, the optimal 
solution for management v/ill 
be betv/een them.
1/P l/r S*
Figure 28
2. min < Sopt* < max ==f> min <. Sopt < Sopt*
If the theoretical solution is betv/een the maximum and 
minimum rates, the employer*s optimal solution v/ill be
le ss than SOPtf and more than the least of thè tv/o discount
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rates (see Figure 29).
Figure 29
3. S O P ^  < min ==$► S 0 p t = S 0p *
In this case, thè theoretical optimal solution lies in thè
segment where thè theoretical profit curve and thè one
whose limits are l/r and 1/P cross dV* _ dV for which
dS ” dS
thè solutions will coincide.
2.4 Final Remarks
Before going on to discuss thè impact of thè model's 
variables on thè solution which will serve as a prologue 
to thè operational version, thè results obtained with 
thè Ashenfelter and Johnson model as presented in this 
work will be enphasized.
Incorporatine thè workers* employment claims in thè 
bargaining model puts a new light on thè prospects and 
results of bargaining itself and on thè limits to thè 
union's actions and interventions. In fact, thè union 
no longer seems limited to thè role of voicing wage demands, 
but assumes a generic responsability towards thè fate of 
thè workers; while on thè other hand, thè employer is no 
longer free to determine employment level (L(Q)) accordine» 
to his wants, but is conditioned by thè needs of thè workers, 
in t u m  determined by thè generai economie situation ).
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ihe last version (third stage) of the model, which 
incorproates defensive employment claims (£, - L(Q)) as 
well as wage claims (A 17) and the respective and distinct 
rates of resistance (p ) and concession (r), permits 
the applicability and validity of the Bargaining Theory 
to be significantly widened even though the formulation 
has been rather simple and manageable.
It conserves the validity and applicability of the 
model which is made up only of wage claims, adding to it 
one of only claims made in defense of employment 
(£. - L(Q)) and of one v/hich contains both.
Introducine; tv/o types of reduction rates for claims, 
one for v/ages and one for employment, has permitted the 
adaptiòn of the model to the union's protest reactions 
v/hich realistically are assumed to vary according 
to the objectives that the union intends to reach.
For the sake of simplicity, a linear for- in v/hich 
only the rate of reduction varies for both tynes of claims 
has been used in the formulation of the model. This 
approach nevertheless suggests further study on thè form 
of the function of the v/orkers' and of the union's actions 
and a qualitative analysis of the appearance of claims 
deriving from the developing phase of the union and, above 
all, from the different context of industriai relations.
Such a model could be applied to expansive periods 
of economie development in v/hich there can be only wage 
claims, and also to periods of recession accompanied by 
a v/eak union and characterized by layoffs not resulting 
in resistance or strikes. In fact, this does not neces­
sari ly impose the presene e of employment claims. Vfhen 
these are also justified by the v/ill of the firn to reduce 
employment (Z - LO) their absence or rapid reduction de-
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pends on thè workers* rate of resistance (P ).
The influence of thè variables in thè model on its 
solution will now be discussed. This will allow an opera­
tional version of thè model to be found, one v/hich will 
be subject to an empirie verification in thè three countries 
previously considered.
Given that:
_ 2Y/T +6 - /(-8 - 2Y/T)2 - 4Y(-ct +6 T tT  
opt = 2 Y
thè duration of a strike that maxinizes management's 
profit will be thè snallest positive solution ^  0. 
Rewriting Sopt in a more simple way, we have that:
4- 1 6 W 6 1 ®s opt = — + —  -y — - + —  + —
T 2Y 1 4y2 y 2 y
thè result will be equal to zero,
dV
S1 - 0 only if dS = 0
s=o
For thè employer, in fact, it v/ould be better to 
give in to thè workers' claims without any proof of strength 
because thè initial profit (n ) v/i 11 be thè mazimum ob- 
tainable given thè limits of thè workers' resistance and 
concession curves.
V/e are faced v/ith a strike when 
dV
S!> 0 if dF >0
s±o
The maximum attainable profit level of thè employer 
leads to resorting to a strike to reduce thè workers' 
claims and will vary in thè following ways:
i# dS°Pt X 0 a = PQ - (tv + V/ ) (LQ +A L)d a
The optimal strike duration for thè firm v/i 11 be greater 
as thè union's demands increase —  be they salariai or 
occupational —— in relation to thè production value.
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In fact, thè larger thè profit margin of thè employer, 
thè easier it v/i 11 be for him to concede thè demanded 
increases to thè v/orkers. This relation betv/een high 
profit margin and easily concedine to demands suggests 
an expanding production phase and therefore pressures 
on thè employer to sell and deliver.
ii d snp -^ > 0 for £ = V70r(LQ + U )  f ALP(? + V/0)
dB V o  for a <0 .2a < -y/r
This is viceversa in thè majority of cases, that is v/hen 
thè union asks less or at most all thè production value, 
thè increase of both v/age and employment claims and thè 
increase in their determination to hold to such demands 
(smaller r and P) v/i 11 naturally lead to a longer strike.
Only in thè case of an irrational or extremely greedy 
union that asks a v/age bill that is higher than production 
value, v/i 11 thè impact of such claims on thè duration of 
thè strike be uncertain. In fact, it could bring about 
either a prolongnent of thè strike in an attempt to reduce 
thè irrational demands or a reduction of thè strike itself 
motivated, for example, by a claim bluff or by a mistaken 
interpretation by thè union of thè f im's profit margin, 
or by thè closing of thè firm or by extemal intervention 
in thè case of reasonable claims made, however, in a firm 
at thè production margin.
Going on to examine thè discount rate:
i n .  S ia t < o
The higher management's discount rate, that is, thè more 
thè present is valued instead of thè future, thè more in­
centive thè employer v/ill have to conclude negotiations 
and thè shorter v/ill be thè strike duration that maximises
his profit.
iv. The sane is true for thè workers' discount rates.
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As has already been seen, the inverses of the rates of 
concession and resistance represent discontinuous points 
for the line of concession and resistance of thè v/orkers. 
The higher these rates are (the lov/er the reciprocai) 
the relatively shorter v/ill be the duration of the strike 
chosen by the employer in order to maximize his profits.
It is important to note, nonetheless, that the rates 
of resistance and concession influence the optimal dur­
ation of a strike in tv/o v/ays: as previously stated, in 
the employer's choice of optimal strike duration (SQpt) 
and directly in the calculation of the employer's maximum
profit limits (Sopt*). infortunately, little can be said
d Soptof the latter as the signs of the derivatives — ;---
.
and Q"0-j^  are indeterminate.

CHAPTER THREE
The Operational Version and Empirical Verification  
of thè Broader Bargaining Model
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An attempt will be made in this chapter to present an 
operational version of thè mathematical model previously described 
and to subject it to empirical verification in thè countries under 
consideration— France, Italy and Great Britain, between 1950 
and 1980.
The passage from a mathematical model to an econometrie one 
is not direct. It is first necessary to overcome thè deter- 
ministic character of thè algebraic model in which thè dependent 
variable, strikes, is determined simultaneously by thè relation-
Aships of thè model between thè exogenous variables (AW, W, AL,
LQ, PQ, r, p, t ) and to substitute them with a stochastic version 
in which one or more random variables appear. Moreover, it is 
indispensable to reformulate thè relations expressed by thè 
model in a less complex form with linear parameters and to find 
operational proxies for thè economie variables in thè model.
The stochastic character of thè model has thè role of absorbing 
thè imperfections of measure and of aggregation present in thè 
data utilized for thè tests and thè element of error, above all 
thè eventual errors of thè model in specification, in lack of 
important variables, or in inappropriate specification of thè 
relations.
In thè case under examination, there is no strict 
correspondence between economie variables used in thè model and 
statistical data.
For example, there is no detailed and systematic information 
on wage increases demanded by thè workers. The difference 
between thè quantity of work thè firm needs and that which thè 
trade union wants to maintain is even less known. Thus, one 
falls back on suppositions regarding workers1 rates of 
resistance and concession.
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Furthermore, the analysis that has been confronted in order 
to develop a bargaining model is a microeconomic one that has 
its fulcrum in the bargaining unit with the finn or firms on 
one side and the workers on the other. It is quite different 
from statistical sources found on a national scale and can be 
reduced at most to a single economie sector.^"
3.1 Operational Derivation of the Mathematica! Model 
The final result of the mathematica! model was:
(I) Sopt =
P- + 6 + / ( - B  -  I 1T )2 - 4y(- et + f)
2y
which rewritten in complete form with the variables with which 
it was originally formulated is:
(II) Sopt =
2W ALp
+ W r (LQ + AL) + ALp(W + W )o o
(-WQr(LQ-AL) - ALp(W+WQ) -
2WQ ALrp 2
- 4WQALrp(- (PQ - (W+WQ)
W r(LQ+AL) + ALp(W+W ) '
• (LQ + AL) ) + — -------------------- — )
1/2
/2WQALrp
The optimal strike duration that maximizes management’s 
profit under the two limits of workers’ claims is determined in 
the mathematical solution by the variables of the model: 
wages claims (WQ), previous contract salary (W), labor claims
(AL), the labor the firm wants to employ (LQ), production 
value (PQ), and the respective discount rates (t) of management,
1In statistical data there are also regional subdivisions that 
really do not resolve the problem but statistically complicate
it because of the particularly of geographic areas.
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and r and p of thè workers.
Nevertheless, thè complexity of thè relations between 
thè variables of thè solutions impedes identification of thè 
impact each one has on thè dependent variable, and, there­
fore, hinders thè construction of an operational version.
To overcome this impasse it is necessary to refer to thè 
conclusions of Chapter Two, where thè ties between thè vari­
ables in thè simplified version and strikes were examined.
Briefly:
Because I am not in possession of statistical measures 
either for thè variables a, 3, y, t of thè simplified version 
or of thè originai variables that were their components, I 
will try to approximate their economie significance with known 
statistical variables.
For instance, a represents thè employer's profit before 
bargaining begins. This is before thè duration of a strike 
can reduce workers' demands (Wq ,AL). Evidently, this data does
not exist, but as it consists of thè residuai of production 
value minus thè workers' initial wage and labor claims, an 
attempt will be made to approximate this specification.
a = PQ - CW+W ). (LQ + AL)
8 = WQr(LQ+AL) + ALp(W+WQ)
and r and p have an influx that is mainly negative. 2
For more detailed discussions, see 2.4.2
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When thè profits are greater, Sopt will be less. When 
thè production is greater with claiins being Constant, it 
can be deduced Sopt will be less. Vice versa, when thè 
claiins are large with production value remaining Constant, 
thè residuai profit will be less; therefore, there will be 
greater conflict taking place.
As far as industriai production value is concerned, 
information gathered by officiai statistical sources will be 
used. The variation in industriai production [Pro'd. ind. (-) ] 
at time t will be expected to have a negative sign, 
supposing that an increase in industriai production will 
correspond to a reduction in thè likelihood of a strike.
Because a direct statistical measure of workers' claims 
is not available, an attempt will be made to approximate them 
by making some behavioral hypotheses.
In fact, it can be reasonable supposed that workers' 
wage claiins follow objectives to increase or, at least, maintain 
their purchasing power. Therefore, a rise in prices above 
thè monetary wage increase previously contracted will cause 
protests. The index of reai wage lagged by a unit of time, with 
an expected negative sign Iw/pt-l wi H  be taken as a
proxy of claims.
However, thè rate at which this process of erosion of 
workers' reai income, that is thè rate of change of reai income 
[W/P) (-). ] can be used as an indicator of thè strength of
determination of workers or thè trade union to defend demands 
made. In fact, thè faster workers see their purchasing power 
decrease, thè more decisive their defense of their own interests 
will be.^"
^Many other variables influence wage claims and thè determination 
of thè trade union to defend them, to cite just a few: thè
effects of both inflation and income increases in other sectors. 
Nonetheless, I believe that these components are more consistent 
in thè tertiary sector in which wage differences can be con- 
sidered thè most important parameter for wage demands. Some 
studies suggest for thè industriai sector thè presence only of

A
As far as trade union employment demands AL = L - L(Q), 
it can be imaged that with thè technological level remaining 
Constant during a period of expansion thè production increase 
wanted by thè employer would be accompanied by a diffuse 
increase in employment■  ^ This would then be characterized by 
an absence of employment claims and less conflict.
Alternatively, a contraction of production CQ ) would 
lead to a reduction in thè labor thè firm wants to employ
A
(LQ ) with respect to thè previous level (L) and will lead to 
a protest on thè part of workers and thè trade union in defense 
of excess labor (AL).
Supposing that thè greater thè industriai production thè less 
thè likelihood of conflict and thè greater thè reduction in indus­
triai production thè greater thè likelihood of conflict, thè 
variation in industriai production could be used as a proxy for 
thè employment demands.
Therefore, thè variation in industriai production is 
expected to have a negative sign Ilnd. Prod.^ (-).].
In my opinion, thè strength of resistance of thè workers (p) 
can be approximated by thè probability of unemployment for 
thè workers.
The unemployment rate, or even better, thè function of 
ìp CU-Umax), previously inserted in thè mathematical model could
(Footnote continued)
a phenomenon of wage leadership. It is my opinion, then, that 
thè variable (W/P)t, chosen as a proxy of thè trade union's
determination to defend demanded wage increases can be accept­
able, even if it neglects, as on thè other hand, thè entire 
Bargaining Theory does, thè evolution and growth of thè Trade 
Union movement.
^Also applying a labor-saving technology in a period of 
expansion in production, thè employer may not increase 
employment, but should not decrease it.
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be used as its measure. The function i|) is constructed assuming 
that there is a "maximum acceptable" level ( . U m a x )  of unemploy­
ment that the trade unions consider "alarming" because it no 
longer has a frictional or cyclical origin but a structural 
one.^ When the unemployment rate goes above this threshold 
(Umax) and begins to attack the internai market (the core 
groups), the trade union deems it necessary to intervene in 
defense of threatened jobs, and the more the unemployment rate 
exceeds the maximum acceptable threshold, the more decisively 
will the trade union believe it right to intervene. Both the 
unemployment rate and ij> will be expected to have positive 
signs IHU) (+)].2
Recapitulating, the likelihood of conflict at time t will 
be less the greater the industriai production, greater the 
faster workers1 reai income is reduced, and greater the higher 
the unemployment rate.
«
« w w(III) P(S) . = b {Ind. Prod., — , g-, ip (.U) ] + e
t-1 t
b , b , b < 0  b > 0 
1 2  3 **
Before proceeding to an empirical verification of III, I 
will discuss the dependent variable of the equation (S), strikes.
The threshold Umax is politicai and will vary according to 
country, type of trade union organization, and above all, 
according to prospective economie crisis. The unemployment 
function \p, discussed more thoroughly in Chapter 2, is also 
very important because it allows for an integration of a 
politicai component in a rigorously economie model.
2More detailed data on worker mobility as layoffs and quits 
would perhaps be more suitable. The unemployment rate 
being calculated as number of unemployed to the number in the 
entire work force hides phenomena such as implicit unemploy­
ment and discouraged workers that respond to variations in 
the work force with respect to the progress of production.
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Previously, generai terms have been used, such as number of 
strikes, strike duration, and conflict. In order to test 
thè originai model, duration of strikes is needed as a sum of 
thè duration of each strike and not as a sum of hours or days 
lost by thè participants of each strike.'*' In fact, this 
second data which is furnished by officiai statistical sources 
shows thè effects of thè component of workers participating 
in thè conflict and represents more an indicator of economie 
damage than of conflict duration.
For thè above, both thè frequency indicator (number of 
strikes) that represents thè proxy of probability of conflict 
and thè indicator of intensity (number of hours lost per 
strike) will be used as a proxy for strike duration in thè 
verification of thè model.
Moreover, thè choice of indicators is limited by thè data 
furnished by national statistics. In fact, for France only one 
set of data is available, thè number of hours lost per strike. 
After 1967, thè other conflict indicators divided according to 
economie activity were no longer available.
3.2 Empirical Verification: General Principles
In this chapter, thè hypothesis previously discussed will 
be empirically verified in Great Britain, Italy and France from 
1950 to 1980.
For complete clarity, by duration of strikes it is intended 
to mean thè number of days of each strike. Let us suppose 
that in a year there is a one-week strike with ten workers 
participating and another five-week one with three workers. 
The data that interests us is thè sum of thè duration of 
thè strikes, six weeks which averages to three weeks per 
strike. The data given by officiai statistics considers 
twenty-five weeks of strikes which even if it is divided by 
thè number of participants gives an average of 1.9 weeks 
per striker.
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The procedure was aimed at obtaining successive improvements 
on thè proposed model through adaptations of thè specifications 
of thè variables.
Given thè complexity of thè strike phenomenon which presents 
ties and interdependencies with other variables that were not 
considered such as trade union organization, thè system of 
industriai relations, and thè social politicai environment, I 
have preferred to use a simple model and unsophisticated 
techniques in order to not complicate their interpretation.
I have adopted thè classic model of multiple linear regres- 
sion accepting thè hypothesis according to which thè form of 
multiple regression between thè strike and thè independent
t
variables can be expressed, with sufficient approximation and 
significance, by a linear combination of independent variables, 
though retaining thè opportunity to introduce in a second 
phase any eventual transformations of thè variables in order 
to improve thè adaptation of thè model to empirical data. 
Regarding thè procedure for calculating thè estimate of thè 
model of multiple linear regression, thè program Multiple 
Regression Analysis: subprogram regression has been used.^
The program determines thè linear function in successive 
stages, first considering a single explicative variable, then 
two, then three, and so on. First, thè indicator with 
thè largest absolute value coefficient of simple correlation 
with thè strike variable is inserted. The second independent 
variable which presents thè largest index of partial correlation
Multiple Regression Analysis: subprogram regression
(J.O. Kim, F.J. Komout), S.P.S.S. Statistical Package for 
thè Social Sciences, version 8.1, McGraw-Hill, 19 73.

is then inserted."*" The program is repeated until all thè vari­
ables are included or until their insertion is not impeded by a
value already fixed by thè 'F' test relative to thè coefficient
2of partial correlation.
The tests will be carried out within each country, 
adapting thè initial model to a version most suited to high- 
lighting thè links between thè variables.
The ability to compare thè regressions between thè different 
countries while maintaining characteristic national patterns 
is given by thè presence of thè same variables in corresponding 
equations.
The time interval chosen is annual due to thè greater
3accuracy of historical series on strikes made on a yearly base. 
Given thè importance of seasonal cycles of this phenomenon, 
quarterly data also has been examined, and will be reported 
only if its of particular significance.
The model and thè analyses made were developed within thè 
industriai sector; therefore, thè dependent variables will 
include thè number of strikes (MS) and thè number of work days 
lost per strike (MD) in thè manufacturing industries.
Regressions also will be applied to strike data which refers 
to thè entire economy (GS, GD) to verify whether thè 
generai conflict follows a claim pattern that has industriai
- 100 -
This procedure of calculation takes into account thè correla­
tion between thè indicators for which if two of them are 
closely correlated, thè one which is more closely correlated 
with thè dependent variable, is inserted. At thè next step 
in thè program thè other could have a nuli correlation with 
thè residuals of thè regression that has already occurred.
^'F' default value = 0.01.
3 For further clarification and specifications on thè problem 
of historical series on strikes see thè Appendix I, "Limitations 
of Strike Statistics."

characteristics^"— in fact, the opinion is widespread that cl 
in other sectors follow industriai ones— and to verify the 
validity of regression made- with global strike data found in 
literature.
3.3 Great Britain 1950-19792
Empirical verification will now be made in successive 
phases of specification of the model/ starting with a series of 
regressions of simple variables.
The dependent variables used are the number of strikes (MS) 
and of work days lost per strike in manufacturing industries 
(MD) and the number of strikes (GS) or work days lost per 
strike (GD) in the entire economy.
The independent variables used are:
— The rate of change in industriai production obtained from 
the index of production of all manufacturing industries 
according to the formula:
Ind. Prod.. - Ind. Prod.., 3
Ind. Prod. = ------------------------------  • 100.t Ind. Prod.^_^
It is important to keep in mind that all the independent 
variables of the equation are not limited to only the 
industriai sector, see for example, consumer prices and the 
unemployment rate. On the other hand, the hypothesis on 
which the model is constructed is specific to the industriai 
sector.
2For specific information on statistical sources and on the 
elaboration of the historical series of data on Great Britain, 
see Appendix IV. 
oVariations in the productivity of labor as a mechanism of 
wage claims have not been taken into consideration because 
data on the productivity of labor is obtained by dividing the 
production index of all manufacturing industries by the 
number of employed by the industries. Its progress, then, is 
not very far from that of industriai production which 
nevertheless allows for an interpretation that is not limited 
to income share.
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— The reai salary obtained as a ratio between thè index of 
weekly earnings for all manual workers and thè consumer price 
index, lagged by a unit of time (RWt_^).
Consistent with thè hypothesis previously made on thè objectives 
of wage claims as being thè maintenance of purchasing power at 
thè same level, workers construct their claims keeping in 
mind reai income, not just wages and consumer price.
— The rate of change of reai wages with thè above 
mentioned formula (RWt)..
— And thè unemployment rate (Ut) as a ratio between thè
number of unemployed, excluding those temporarily laid off, 
and thè labor force.^
3.3.1. Phase I (Simple Variables)
The first step in verifying thè model was done with a series 
of simple regressions of thè variables of thè model just pre­
sented.
An attempt has also been made to improve thè model by 
making some changes: For example, substituting thè variation in
industriai production (Ind. P) with thè variation in thè rate 
of unfilled vacancies [V (-)] obtained as a ratio between 
thè number of jobs offered and thè number employed. It is my 
opinion that this indicator, as thè preceding one, can be taken 
as a proxy for thè economie cycle, and, on thè one hand, 
represents thè willingness of management to concede salary 
increases and, on thè other, thè willingness of thè trade unions
Though thè problems connected with thè insufficiency and 
ambiguity of information expressed by thè unemployment rate 
will not be discussed, it is nevertheless important to 
keep in mind its insufficiency in interpreting thè likelihood 
of unemployment for industriai workers, above all because 
it does not take into account thè division of job offers.
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and workers to defend jobs. As with thè preceding indicator, it 
will be expected to have a negative sign.
Moreover, thè same set of regressions has been tested with 
or without lagged reai wages and with or without thè time index.
There are raany reasons for thè insertion of thè time factor. 
With this factor an attempt will be made to capture thè secular 
tendency of thè phenomenon in which variations due to thè 
impact of thè economie variables are inserted. In fact, it is 
reasonable to suppose that strike phenomena has a trend of 
macrosociological origins that is influenced by long period 
variations of thè labor force, of thè activity rate, of thè 
unionization rate, of thè rate of instruction of thè workers, 
of their politicai consciousness, as well as others that 
condition their propensity to conflict and thus thè occurrence 
of manifestations of conflict.
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C°°) Legend
Dependent Variables
MS = number of strikes in thè manufacturing industries
MD = number of days lost per strike in thè manufacturing
industries
GS = number of strikes in thè entire economy
GD = number of work days lost in thè entire economy
Independent Variables 
T = time
IND. P. = annual variation in industriai production, 
rate obtained as:
IND.P.^ = (INDP. - INDP, ,)/INDP. . • 100t t t-"± t“ 1
V = annual rate of variation of thè number of unfilled
vacancies
RW = reai wages in industry
RWt_^ = reai wages in industry lagged a year
= monetary industriai wages lagged a year 
RW = annual rate of variation of reai wages in industry 
•
P = annual rate of variations in consumer price index
U = unemployment rate
RW^_^ • RW = wage erosion index
W = annual rate of variation of monetary industriai wages 
t|; = rp (D-Umax).
AI\p = index of thè gravity of thè economie situation obtained 
as a product of INDPt_^/INDPt and ip 
AVip = index of thè gravity of thè economie situation obtained 
as a product of vt-l^Vt and ^
O.C.I = variation in hours conceded from Cassa Integrazione 
Guadagni in industry.
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The tests of equations (la) and (Ib) are differentiated by 
thè cycle indicator, in thè former thè variation in industriai 
production and in thè latter, thè number of vacancies.
S.E.E. = Standard Errors of Estimate of thè estimated 
coefficients of regression are in parenthesis under thè 
corresponding coefficients.
R2 is thè coefficient of determination of thè entire regression. 
DW is thè Durbin-Watson statistic.
'F' test of statistical significance.
* 99% significance (for regression coefficients according to 
thè 'F' test).'*’
**95% significance.
(/) independent variable not included in thè calculation of 
regression because of 'F' default value 0.01.
The ' F' test relative to thè regression coefficients is 
obtained from thè relation between thè estimated regression 
coefficient and thè corresponding standard error, a random 
variable results with distribution ' t' with (n-k) degree 
of freedom. Nonetheless, since quantity 't' is a relationship 
between a standardized normal random variable and thè 
square root of a variable (x2) divided by its degree of 
freedom, if we square at a quantity ’F' is obtained with 
(1, n-k-1) degrees of freedom.
(n = number of cases, in our case 30, which is thè 
number of years considered; k = number of explicative 
variables present in thè regression equation.)
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From examining Tables 1A, B, C, and D, it can be seen that 
thè proposed model does not adapt itself to interpreting 
strike data that refers to thè entire economy (see equations III 
and IV of each block in thè above-mentioned tables). Even 
though thè variables of regression are almost always significant 
in thè case of number of strikes, thè coefficient of determination 
which measures thè part of variation of thè dependent variable, 
as explained by thè model used, never goes above 50% and thè 
result can be considered unsatisfactory.
This result was foreseeable in part by an examination of 
thè graphs of conflict indicators, number of strikes, and hours 
lost for thè manufacturing industries (solid line) and for 
thè entire economy (broken line), see page 103-4* The two jagged 
lines develop very differently before 1967 regarding number 
of strikes, while differences are accentuated after 1970 
regarding hours lost. As much as this fact leads to emphasizing 
thè appropriateness and importance of thè limitations of 
applicability of thè Bargaining Theory model; nevertheless, it 
does not authorize excluding thè applicability of thè model or 
of a similar one to other sectors of thè economy, for example, 
thè tertiary sector. It is my opinion that global strike data 
GS, GD is affected by thè anomalous behavior of thè mining- 
quarrying sector^- and in thè last few years by thè transportation 
sector in thè component days lost.
2 .The study by P. Galambos and E.W. Evans is also 
illuminating in this regard. It brings out thè composition by 
sector of thè number of strikes as seen in thè following table.
■^See M.A. Turner (1963) who considers thè mining sector a 
special case, and thè article by L. Lynch (1978) on thè coal- 
mining sector in Great Britain, J. Pencavel (1970).
^P. Galambos and E.W. Evans (1973).
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The number of strikes in the manufacturing industries (MS), 
equation (I) of each section of 1A, B, C, and D will now be 
analyzed.
At first glance, they present a coefficient of deter­
mina tion R 2 which is very high, from 0.75 to 0.81. The 
model which has been used does not seem to adapt itself to 
interpreting the development of the number of strikes phenomenon 
in industry. In fact, only two variables are always significant, 
unemployment rate and reai wages. Moreover, if the latter is 
lagged a year it loses its significance in favor of trend.
More specifically, variation in industriai production and 
variation in number of vacancies are never significant. The 
use of one or the other variable, both of which are indicators 
of the economie cycle, produces no difference in test results.
Furthermore, the rate of fluctuation of reai wages never 
becomes sufficiently significant whereas the only significant 
variables, unemployment rate and reai wages, have signs 
different than the expected ones: negative for unemployment
and positive for reai wages.
These results, upheld in successive versions of the model, 
lead one to suppose that in the United Kingdom the number of 
strikes, or more generally the likelihood of a strike 
beginning, is less when the unemployment rate is higher and 
that there is a positive trend in increase in claims even when 
there are increases in reai wages.
The indicator MD, number of days lost per strike, equa­
tion (II) of Tables 1A, B, C, and D, seem to adapt themselves 
better to the model.
— The variation in industriai production and in vacancies 
are never significant.
This result can be explained by the fact that these two 
variables are indicators of the economie cycle. In fact, if 
it is true that in periods of expansion management is more
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willing to give in to workers' claims because there will be a 
higher profit margin and because production deadlines have to 
be met, then thè workers will tend to increase their demands 
given their greater blackmail power (damage to thè firm).
The final influence on probability of conflict could, therefore, 
be nothing.
— The unemployment rate, a cruciai variable for thè model, 
always has a positive sign, as expected.'*'
— The rate of change of reai income which always has a positive 
sign is not always significant, while reai wages are always 
significant whether or not they are lagged or if they are 
accompanied by thè time index.
In examining thè whole of equation (II) in group D, it 
presents a negative trend (always negative in thè corresponding 
equations), lagged reai wages, and variation in reai wages 
and unemployment rate that are positive and significant at 99%. 
It also presents a coefficient of determination R 2 0.60 and 
D.W. 1.9 which shows, given thè lack of autocorrelation of 
thè residuals, thè efficiency of thè estimates.
It seems that this second measure of strikes better adapts 
itself to thè improved model. The positive unemployment rate 
seems to be a good start in interpreting it along thè lines 
laid out in thè preceding chapters.
The tests were done using also (1/U) instead of thè 
unemployment rate, assuming a nonlinear relation between 
unemployment and conflict. The results were hardly 
satisfying even though they presented thè expected sign 
which in this case was negative. Nonetheless, (1/U) 
did not reach a sufficient level of significance and thè 
coefficient of determination R 2 wa? always less than thè 
corresponding one in thè equations in Tables 1A, B, C, 
and D.
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3.3.2 Phase II W
The second step made to improve the specification of the 
model under empirical verification was to construct the 
variable \p = (U-Umax) . It was obtained by choosing a value 
Umax maintained to be the necessary limit in making the union 
react in defense of the workers.
After having studied the historical series of unemployment 
rates, a threshold of 4% was chosen. In fact, in 1975 the 
unemployment rate in Great Britain, after having fluctuated 
for twenty years around 2%, varying from 1.1 to 2.6, 
suddenly jumped to 4.1% and continued to climb in the years 
following to 5.7, 6.2, 6.1, and 5.7. The question was 
whether or not to choose a lower threshold. On the one hand, 
a lower one did not seem significant enough to determine 
trade union action. On the other, it would have enabled 
consideration of the years 1971-1972 in which unemployment rate 
went from 2.6 in 1970 to 3.4 and 3.8 and then went down to 
2.7 in 1973. Inasmuch as it was temporary, this increase did 
not seem enough to cause a protest by the workers and the 
satisfactory results obtained with a 4% threshold validates 
that choice.
As can be seen from Table U.K. no. 2 A/B, the results 
partially follow the preceding lines of interpretation for the 
conflict indicators which, referring to the entire economy, 
generally are not well interpreted by the proposed model 
even though an improvement can be noted in equation (IVb) in 
which the coefficient of determination and of the significance of 
the variables increases, and for the number of strikes in the 
manufacturing industries (MS) which, as in the preceding 
version has good statistical tests but only two significant 
variables, the time index which has a positive sign and \p 
with a negative one, which is the opposite of what was 
expected.
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As far as the number of work days lost in the manufacturing 
industries (MD) is concerned, the results of the regression (II) 
are notably improved, the coefficient of determination R 2 
increases and goes from 0.59 (equation (Ila), Table no. 1/D) 
to 0.68 which shows a growing explanatory ability from the 
proposed model. The significance of the avariables increases 
while keeping the previous signs of regression, negative for 
time, positive for reai wages and its variation, positive as 
expected for ij;,^  and industriai production is not significant. 
Finally, the D.W., showing the lack of autocorrelation of 
the residuals, assures the accuracy of the estimate.
3.3.3 Phase III (AIip, RWfc_1 • RW)
Encouraged by this success, an attempt was made to perfect 
the specification of the model, hearing in mind that the 
mathematical version which represented the entirety of wage and 
employment claims of the workers with a positive effect on 
conflict, was made up of those same claims multiplied by their 
respective concession and resistance rates (WQr and ALp).
1 then thought of restructuring the two products by obtaining 
an index of economie gravity and one of wage erosion.
A. Index of Economie Gravity
The variation in industriai production, as was the 
variation in the rate of unfilled vacancies in the economy, was 
obtained as a percentage of variation, with the followmg
formula: A = resultin9 in a variable that has a
negative sign with decreasing production.
^Compared to the mathematical version ip = a(U-Umax), the 
variable that was constructed presumes the value a = 1.
2For more detail, see Appendix IV.
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Because the formulation did not lend itself to the scope 
of the research, the indices of variation of these variables
were reconstructed as the relation A' = in such a way as
to obtain a variable that would increase (AI, AV) when there 
is a worsening of the economie situation, a reduction in 
industriai production or in the number of vacancies. In fact, 
this variation multiplied by the variable ^ previously 
described, gives rise to two indices of economie gravity Alty 
and AVip that can interpret the employment claim of the 
trade union. As previously stated, the more industriai produc-
Ation is reduced, in the mathematical model LQ < L, the more 
the trade unions will want to protest against the threat of 
layoffs, and the greater will be the likelihood of unemployment, 
the more violent will be their protest.
Therefore, AIìp and AVip, indicators of economie gravity 
intended as a reduction in industriai production and threat of 
unemployment, will stimulate strikes and will be expected to 
have positive signs.
As can be seen in Table U.K. no. 3/A, in examining only 
MD, the indices of economie gravity are always significant and 
have the expected positive sign.
In order to be thorough, the tests for MS have been
reported. Though the results are not amenable to the model that
has been used, they are even less so to its variations.
B . Index of Wage Erosion
Having by now identified the indicator adapted to inter­
preting the "gravity" of the economie situation, the indicator 
of wage erosion (RWt-i * RW  ^ can now added to tIie equa tion
(see Table 3/B, equation (Ila) for MD).
This index, as the preceding one, was obtained by
multiplying the two components of wage claims: the wage demand,
the operational proxy which was identified as lagged reai wage,
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and thè strength of determination of thè claims, thè rate of 
change of reai wages.
When lagged reai income is higher and it will increase 
faster and thè likelihood of conflict about wages will be less. 
Vice versa, when thè reai income is lower and it will 
decrease more (thè more slowly it rises), thè likelihood of 
conflict will be greater. The expected sign is therefore 
negative.
The results for thè dependent variable MD are clearly 
improved. The coefficient of determination R2 rises to 
0.80 relative to 0.59 in thè first equation. As before, 
variation in industriai production is not significant.
The trend is significant and has a negative sign, as always.
The variable of thè gravity of thè situation in thè economie 
cycle is positive as expected. The wage erosion index and 
lagged reai wages are significant but positive.
This last result leaves one a bit perplexed. In fact, if 
thè positive link of thè indicator of thè gravity of thè 
economie situation can be associated with employment claims, it 
nonetheless seems contradictory to have a positive link between 
strikes and reai wage index, variations in reai wages, and thè 
composite index. It would be more rational and conform with 
thè hypotheses previously made, to suppose that when reai income 
decreases, wage claims presented by thè workers would increase.
A study on wage claims has been made to investigate this
idea.
3.3.4 Phase IV (A Study on Wage Claims)
It was decided to substitute thè variation of reai wages, 
indicator of thè workers1 determination in their wage claims, 
with its components, variation in (P) consumer prices and 
variation in monetary wages (W).

<I
I M < M
H
M
o O 3 3 o Cì 3 3D tn D cn D cn D cn
o O
1 1 0 1 1 i 0NJ U) u IO i Ul ro (a
vi Ul + rt vo ro 00 rt
U> vo vo CU CO Ul ro O CU
OS 00 ro Ul D to to O 3VO ro vo vo rt vi rt
—  1 l ~  l
viui h-1 —  1 .__ CO K*
H  + .&> (-< •*-- + O  as 00 1 ro (-• <-» +
00 O O  io Ul Ul ui vo •-3 oo O ct\ ro ui ro •-3
t-* H* u) ai u> o v] ■£*• co ■— ■ 4^  1-*
* * X-
x-
—  1 —  I .
~  1 — . i H Ul to l—* I—1 to 1 M
U» tO j»""K to 1—1 *-t i z m  as \ as ai O  co zai ui + O  ** to , | O •t* £* ~J 00 *— O.ù. oo u> vo Ul U) *13 ■— ■ 13• •
/-% + «-» + + ■— . + ^  +
IO to ,^-K H* UJ .— , M  IO IO (-• 00 CJ —  +
O  O' ro + )-• Ul (-> 1 2 00 vi IO VO vi CO I—* I-1 »co O Ul H> cn ro s: ai oo Ul 1—1 oi as i-* as s
O O  to VO CO O  co r+ O  oi Ul Ul VO 1—* vo oi (t
co to 00 00 VO VO vo vo » vo <xi — • vo Ul 1
'“'x- X- t—*
-, + ^  1 •—- ■+■ ■— • 1
tO M ^  + (—1 K> —  + to I-* —  + h-> 1—*
co vi N) Ul to •&• i—* •&• ro vi ro un O  N> \ w
O  O VO Ul co to cri oi O as oo OS U)
O  oo VO Ul IO Ul Ul vi Ul vi t—1 CO to
» X-
*
-— . + —  1 —  1 ' +
—  1 — . 1 o^ I-* —  I JO l—1 vo (-■ U) Ul t-* »
K* VO M  OJ 00 t—* 00 to rK2 ro cti £>> vi Vi O rtS
to o\ Ul 04 U> .U CD £» 1 • t—1 co Ol 00 O as \ 1 •
to Ul VO <7\ '— t-w t-1 — 00 H O
cn ^  * * ’ X- a
X-
—  I
to 1—* ~  1 — S + —  1 —~ i —  1 —  + —  1
U) VO UJ H» ^ H* CO ro to NJ ^ h-* Ul 1—1 Ul
vo O M  CT* UJ U> vj CO > ro O nj ro O  ro ■e* ai >
vo M ro vo LJ *-» Ul O H -J £* *t>» ro ~j to Ul vi <
o^ IO u> O *fc* M  <J> -6- vi to nJ iU Ut £* •u vo -6-
w  * <T» ^ W  X- vo cri ^  * ^  Ul X-
W *
o O o O O o o O• • « • • • • •
U> Ul -J vj » CJ Ul 00 »
as CO IO co to Ol ro o vi ro
I-*
IO H* ro • ro t—* to I-1
• • • 4* a • • • • oo >u % i-* vi Ul Ul s;cr»
IO vo H* I-1 to• • • ro to Ul O(-* Ul • • •vi i—1 00
- 122
Table 
U.K. 
1950-80 
n.3/s 
( oo)

HI
«Ti
*3
OtO
*
to'CO
ro
OD
to
cn
•— • +  
*-• cn h* o> 
j_» O»
S 3
O
N>
o
N>
NJ
M
3
cn
l
cn
*
—  +
* 0JS°
•— - +  10 10
CO -E* a  CO
—  +
h - M  
ro -N co o -UJ
I
h-> ^
CD CO
■ss qì-
—  1
«.UìS  toOD
*
1•--
I-* -b. co 0  
ro 0w  Hi
-
3
.
8
(
1
.
8
)
-j
00
cn
o>
n
o
u
ci­di
3
Ci-
et
I
>
<
-e-
jo
IO
H
I
cn
-J
0
00
I^ (-<
00
4(3
N oi 
O  cn!£, OD 
*
fO
CO
ro
+
cn
Co
o>
-fc>
01
*
-—. +  t—* <y>
CO jo
S Ì■U -vj w  *
I
ro' od 
O  co 
c a  o  
*
i-» -t>.
CO O)
2 °,
01
IO
3
cn
cn
•u10
no
tortB>
3
c+
a\ o
S M**
fo +00 UI
t—1 Ieri cr. 00 <J1 
O  CD
zO
»
c+I
—  I(-< J». 00 l—1 VD COO 10 *
ro + 
M  cn
W
-j
00
fo
a\
Table 
U.K. 
1950-80 
n.4 
fro 
)

- 124 -
Conforming with thè hypotheses previously made, thè more 
reai wages decrease, thè faster prices increase, and thè more 
monetary wages decrease, thè more workers will want to protest 
in order to defend their purchasing power. Variation in reai 
wages (RW) with an expected negative sign has been substituted 
by thè variation of (P) prices with an expected positive sign 
and thè variation of monetary wages (W) with its expected 
negative sign.
By examining thè results of Table 4, equation (Ila), 
referring to thè number of work days lost in industry, thè 
opposite of what is expected can be seen, as happened 
previously. The variation in prices, which is significant, 
has a negative sign and thè variation in monetary wages, which 
is also significant, has a positive one.
An attempt has been made to investigate thè relationships 
of wage claims by applying thè multiplicative model and 
thè regression with thè logarithms of thè variables. Industriai 
production, unemployment rate, reai wages and alternatively 
monetary wages, and consumer prices have been inserted in thè 
regression. The preceding results were confirmed by thè 
positive sign of reai and monetary wages and by thè negative 
sign of consumer prices, all of which were highly significant.
As far as days lost per strike (MD), thè statistical 
test CR2 • 0.67, D.W. 2.2) were less than thè previous ones 
in thè linear version, and this was also true as a whole 
for (MS) thè number of strikes where thè increase in thè 
coefficient of determination (R2 • 0.91) was compensated for 
by a worsening of thè D.W. test (D.W. 1.3). It is 
necessary to interpret these results.
Cella, thè author who is closest to this approach because 
he analyzes thè period 1946-71 using annual data, obtains 
similar results using as a dependent variable thè number of days 
lost in thè entire economy excluding thè mining and quarrying 
sector.
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The coefficient of variation of reai wages is positive and 
significant, confirmed by the negative sign of price variations 
which is not always significant. The interpretation suggested 
by the author, utilizing the efficient terminology adopted 
by Bain and Elsheikh for unionization, is based on a "credit 
effect" that raises wage expectations and faith in a 
successful strike after repeated increases in reai wages.
In other words, it would not be the compression of the 
consumer level that brings about conflict but phenomena of 
"wage catch-up”^ sustained by the greater financial capacity 
of the workers who can allow themselves the resources to invest 
in future wage increases.
This result also can be interpreted in a more economie 
way be considering the mechanism of workers' expectations. The 
version proposed hypothesizes that which can be called a 
purely defensive wage claim based-on the presumption of a 
continuai delay of the workers that only if it is surpassed 
by inflation will the workers protest in order to recover 
their purchasing power.
On the other hand, the positive sign of the coefficients 
of the wage claim indicators leads one to suppose the presence 
of a mechanism of expectations that is the fruit of memory 
of past experiences for which the greater the wage increases 
the higher the expectations will be and thus the likelihood 
of conflict is greater.
■^ On the importance of the modification of the relative
differentials between categories of workers, cfr. M.A. Clegg,
1970.

As in thè preceding section, successive phases in specifica- 
tion of thè model will be treated.
The dependent variables, number of strikes (MS) and of 
work days lost per strike in thè manufacturing industries (MD) 
and thè number of strikes (GS) and of work days lost per 
strike (GD) in thè entire economy, have been interpreted with:
— thè unemployment rate (U) given by thè relation between 
thè unemployed, people in search of a first job or others 
looking for work over thè labor force,
— thè rate of change of industriai production obtained as a 
percent variation in thè industriai production index (I.P.) ,
— reai wages lagged by a year (RWt_^) obtained as a relation-
ship between minimum contracted wages for workers of thè 
manufacturing industries including welfare (W) and thè generai 
cost-of-living index (P),
— thè variation in reai wages has been replaced by its two 
components, change in price(P;and change in wages (W), in 
order to better identify their respective effects, and
— finally, for reasons already mentioned above, thè time 
variable has been inserted.
3.4.1 Phase I (Simple Variables)
From thè results of thè tests presented in Table 1 A/B, it 
can immediately be noted that in contrast to Great Britain, 
thè tendency toward conflict in thè entire economy follows a 
model that has an economic-industrial interpretation. In fact, 
in thè regression thè dependent variables GD or GS give results 
that are at times better than thè corresponding MD and MS for
- 126 -
3.4 Italy 1950-19801
■*"For more detailed information on statistical sources or on 
thè historical series of data on Italy, see Appendix III.
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thè manufacturing industries. Nevertheless, thè result was 
foreseeable given thè similar, if not identical, developments 
of thè two strike indicators in industry and in thè entire 
economy. This can easily be seen in graphs no. 1/2.
This fact can be interpreted first of all by ascertaining 
that in Italy there is no sector with an atypical tendency 
toward conflict which changes thè generai progress of conflict 
and deviates it from thè industriai one.
Secondarily, this means that thè other economie sectors, 
and above all new groups that entered thè conflict arena at 
thè end of thè sixties, that is Commerce, Transportation, 
and Public Administration, have adopted a pattern of claims 
that is "borrowed" from thè industriai sector (cfr. Table 
Italy No. A ) .
Therefore, thè strike variables for industry will be 
analyzed at thè same time as those for thè entire economy.
The examination of equations (II and IV) of thè variables
work days lost per strike (MD, GD) in both industry and thè 
generai economy demonstrates how much these indicators are 
not sensitive to thè proposed interpretive model. In fact, 
thè coefficient of determination Rz varies around thè 
threshold of 50% and almost all thè variables of thè model are 
not significant. As will be seen later, thè course of 
strike duration is captured mainly by thè time variable and by 
thè lagged monetary wages variable.
The number of strikes in industry and in thè economy (MS, GS)
better responds to thè model; on a positive trend there is a
protest reaction to thè reduction in lagged reai wages. The 
results of thè regression tests are improved above all in thè 
version that considers lagged monetary wages (wt-l^ as an
indicator of wage demands instead of lagged reai wages (which 
has a correlation that is too high with time (0.9) and varia- 
tions in consumer prices (P) as thè indicator of workers' 
determination in carrying through their claims instead of thè
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Table 
Italy 
1950-80 
n.l 
A/B 
tot)

TABLE IT A L Y
Number of worfcing day* lost through industriai «toppages. by branch of activity fcomj
«
• •
tari 1*71 ID I 1*74 tara 1*77
• 10 00
• • • '
. fTAUA •-
1 Agricitftura, forvsoy. fiattng 2 2 5 0 12 3 9 743 1 2 1 4 3 188 2006 1 131
2 Extracdon Industri*» 86 225 180 9S 192 96 58
3
4
. 5
5  
7  
•
\ #
10
1 1
12
13
Manufacturing "mdustriee
-  Food, drink, tobacco
-  Tuctiaa
-  Ootfàng
-  FootwMr. leaihar and cormactad produca
-  Wood and furntur*
-  Matala and machnary
-  Non-matsfliferous rrwnmak
-  Owmicais and njbbar
-  Pacar and pnrang
-  MoctfanaoL*
5 826 
472 
375  
193 
2 13  
49 
2 676 
338  
782 
661 
68
8 92S 
3 13  
344 
192 
47 
58 
S 647 
443 
1 652 
156  
74
14 372
129 
17 0 5
207
226
284
9840
498
995
360
130
10 189 
616  
949 
4 17  
210  
208 
5 664 
248 
1 241 
251  
385
8 328 
291 
874 
402 
203 
249 
3 977 
220 
1 350  
304 
460
12 196
349 
13 7 3
399 
195 
286 
7 189
350  
1 428
249
378
8451 
524 
846 
255 
100 
107 
4 477 
263 
1 160 
398 
321
14 Budcfing 248 18 8 5 283 12 4 3 1 941 1 701 1 171
15 Bactriaty. gaa and watar - 68 118 253 —17 1 149 94 4«
16 Commaroa 407 142 10 5 8 726 10 8 1 1 396 191
17 Tranaporr and ootnmuriicattan 897 938 1606 774 1 569 1 0 1 4 627
18 financa and irauranoa 182 908 48 180 221 623 •1
IS SarUeaa and miaoaflarwoua aodal actfvM— 781 14 2 3 682 916 1 259 962 1 199
20 PufaCe adniiiUliation 2 2 1 4 12 S 8 12 6 7 15 2 6 5 864 2 119 1560
2 1 Tool of woriong days loat 12949 17060 20492 17  033 2 3 7 9 1 22206 14 495
22 Working day* loat par 1 000 amploy** 950 12 4 5 14 7 2 1 200 16 6 9 1 542 1000
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two components of variation in reai wages, variation of prices 
and of wages, which mutually annui each other and have a 
correlation of 0.91.^
In fact, in conforming with the preceding hypotheses, 
workers reduce their wage claims with an increase in monetary 
wages, but at an increase in variation in prices, they 
protest in order to hold back a cost-of-living increase.
The variation in industriai production (IP) in this 
second version, which incorporates monetary wages, is significant 
and has the expected negative sign (cfr. equation (III)).
The unemployment rate variable which indicates the 
likelihood of workers to find jobs was used as a measure of 
workers' determination to defend their own jobs and is never 
significant.
This variable will now be discussed. Along with the 
variation in industriai production, it should characterize 
employment claims. It has already been noted that the 
variation in industriai production often is not significant 
for the fact that too many conflicting influences interpose 
themselves. The more industriai production increases, the more 
management will be willing to concede salary increases and 
will increase (or at least not reduces) employment; therefore, 
workers will make wage claims but not employment ones. The 
influence of this variable on strikes is doubtful even if the 
negative component should prevail. Having first encountered 
a negative value for the index of simple correlation between 
this variable and GS and MS respectively at -0.4 3 and -0.4 5 
and then the negative sign of its regression coefficient 
(significant only for MS), would lead one to suppose that in 
Italy there are smaller claims in periods of expanding production.
"^ 1 realize this version hypothesizes a certain monetary illusion 
of the workers that at an increase in monetary salary they reduce 
the conflict, but this was unavoidable in order to obtain a 
degree of adaptability of the model in its entirety. Moreover, 
if variation in monetary salary as well as variation in consumer 
price is considered, we only succeed in losing the significance 
of the two coefficients.
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Therefore, there would be assumptions for an interpreta- 
tion that follows the model of employment claims.
The insignificance of the unemployment rate nonetheless 
causes some doubt. The perplexity is re-enforced by the 
significance of its regression coefficient which has a negative 
sign if the time variable of the regression is eliminated.
It is my deep conviction that, above all, in Italy a 
highly conflictual country, the insertion of the time variable 
is indispensable in grasping the national connotations of 
manifestations of protest that have cultural and socio- 
political origins. Nevertheless, the validity of the 
specification of this connotation expressed by the arithmetical 
progression of a linear trend remains to be proved.^
3.4.2 Phase II (iJj)
The variable ip = (U-Umax) will now be constructed. In 
the case of Italy, the choice of unemployment threshold that 
the trade unions consider alarming was more complex than for 
Great Britain. In fact, the historical series on unemployment, 
already at a high level, shows much higher values than average 
at the beginning of the 50's. I have, nevertheless, maintained 
it is possible to exclude those years inasmuch as the employment 
rate after the first World War was high, not so much as a result 
of loss of jobs but as a result of the increase in the labor 
force (entrance of women into the job market).
In this approach, the unemployment level "alarms" the trade 
union inasmuch as it is an indicator of the likelihood of future
The variation in industriai production has been substituted 
by the index of utilized productive capacity which, in my 
opinion, should better interpret the course of production with 
respect to the job market. Nonetheless, this has never 
proved to be significant and the determination coefficient 
of the regression is less than the previous ones. The 
regressions were also done with the inverse of the unemployment 
rate with no better results.
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unemployment, and corresponds to a phase in which there is a 
fall in demand and in production. This tie allows for excluding 
thè period of economie reconstruction and thè successive boom. 
Another reason that is political-organizational in character, 
permits excluding thè 50's. In fact, thè employment claims 
that have been described are characteristic of a mature trade 
union that is strong and well-rooted in thè system of industriai 
relations and that, therefore, does not correspond to thè 
trade union after thè first World War.
A threshold of 5% was decided upon. The results of thè 
regressions are satisfactory only for GS and MS, thè only 
variable that can be interpreted by thè proposed model. The
tests of equations (I) and (III) of Table No. 2 will be
analyzed. All thè variables of thè model have significant 
coefficients of regression with thè expected sign. The 
coefficients of determination is very high, 0.78 and 0.80, 
which shows that thè specification of thè model in large part 
interprets 80% of thè variation of thè dependent variable. 
Nonetheless, for both thè equations thè variables show thè D.W. 
test in an uncertainty area which does not assure efficient 
estimates.
3.4.3 Phase III (AIi|»; RWt_1*RW)
The index of economie gravity (AIip) was then constructed
working as before, by constructing first an index (AI) of 
thè variation in industriai production such that at a
decrease in production it increases an<i multiplying it
by thè variable ip.
Even though thè results were good, they were no better 
than thè previous ones. In fact, thè coefficients of determina­
tion were slightly less. The insertion of thè wage erosion 
variable (RWt-i * RW  ^ not ixnProve the test. In fact, thè
variable itself is never significant and the variation in 
industriai production loses its significance.
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3.4.4 Phase IV (Cassa Integrazione Guadagni)
The application of the model to Italy is completed by 
considering one last variable, the authorized hours of Cassa 
Integrazione Guadagni (C.I.G.) conceded by industry. C.I.G.
(a form of unemployment Insurance) which began after World 
War II is a tool used in interventions in defense of workers' 
wages that the firm with the consent of the trade unions can 
use in periods of temporary market crisis and, since 1968, 
for the restructuring, reorganizing and reconversion of 
industry.^" It consists in an integration of the workers' 
wages which can vary from 80% to 99%, and can reach a maximum2of forty hours per week, without any established time limits.
Given the low insurance coverage of the unemployed (the3lowest m  Europe), the system of reducing work hours and 
unemployment compensation (financed by the Instituto Nazionale 
per la Previdenza Sociale) has become the only tool that 
can be used by firms in a stagnant phase or in crisis. From 
a tool to protect labor, it has been transformed into a tool 
which guards workers' income in periods of crisis.
Besides institutional changes which hinder a direct use 
of the historical series, it is my opinion that the variation 
in hours conceded by C.I.G. justly illustrates the repercussions 
of industriai production on the job market and can, therefore, 
be substituted by it in this study.
An increase in authorized hours of workers employment
For a clear and detailed analysis of the mechanism of Cassa 
Integrazione Guadagni, see P. Munzi Bitetti, La Garanzia del 
Salario, Ministero del Bilancio report, 1980; Y. Krause,
"The Impact of Unemployment Insurance on Unemployment," 
paper in progress, IUE 1980; M. Ferrera, Suiluppo e crisi 
del Welfare State in Italia (1981).
2 . . .In 1979, law no. 624 established the maximum limit at
two years.
^European Communities (1976), p. 48.
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compensation^ will correspond to a phase in which production 
drops and will, therefore, provoke workers' reaction in defense 
of their jobs.
The expected sign of thè variation [O.C.I. (+)] of con- 
sented hours, if substituted in thè regression by thè variation 
in industriai production, will be positive. As can be seen 
in Table 4, for thè variables GS and MS thè results confimi 
this hypothesis. The model with simple variables is improved 
by thè substitutìon of thè unemployment rate with thè 
variable ty.
As far as equations (I) and (III) are concerned, thè 
significance of thè variables and thè coefficient of 
determination R 2 increase. The D.W. test remains thè same 
in thè area of uncertainty of thè test.
All thè variables have thè expected sign: positive for
thè variation in consumer prices, negative for lagged reai 
wages which confirms thè hypothesis of wage claims from an 
erosion in purchasing power, and positive for thè variable 
and for thè variation in allowed hours of Cassa Integrazione 
Guadagni in favor of claims made in defense of employment.
A pattern of wage and employment claims regarding thè
number of strikes would seem to be confirmed in Italy, be they
only in thè industriai sector or in thè entire economy, while
in reference to thè number of hours lost, thè trend component
2seems to prevaxl.
"^The authorized hours of C.I.G. are thè only data given by 
thè Ministero del Lavoro.
2It would be interesting to strengthen thè ties between Cassa 
Integrazione and job mobility of which thè layoff rate may be 
considered succedoneous data. Nevertheless, these indica- 
tions are beyond thè scope of this research given thè lack 
of comparable information in thè other countries under study. 
France does not have thè statistical classification of layoffs 
and Great Britain published only thè total number of out- 
going workers.
- 140 -
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3.5.1 Phase I (Simple Variables)^
The first test of thè model, as in thè preceding examina-
tions, will be made with thè specification in which thè impact
of thè simple variables is considered: time, reai wages
lagged one year (RW^._^) which is obtained by thè relation
between thè index of thè weekly wage rate in industry— a 
product of thè index of hourly wage times thè duration of thè 
paid work week— and thè consumer price index, thè variation 
rate of that index (RW), thè change in industriai production 
(IP) which includes construction industries, thè unemployment 
rate (U) obtained as a relation between unfilled jobs and 
thè labor force. This last indicator is particularly weak 
because, it is influenced by thè extension of thè Agences 
National pour l'Emploi since 1968 that registers thè job 
market.
The dependent variables will be thè number of work days 
lost per strike (GD)_ and thè number of strikes (.GS) in thè 
entire economy and just thè number of days lost (MD) in thè 
manufacturing industries. In fact, data on thè number of 
strikes by economie sector has not been available since 1967.
Moreover, data on thè variation in jobs offered (V) has
been used instead of thè change in industriai production.
The inverse of thè unemployment rate, has been used
instead of thè unemployment rate itself.
From Table no. 1/A it can be seen that thè component 
days lost per strike barely lends itself to thè explanation of 
this model. The variable (GD) in reference to thè entire 
economy will no longer be taken into consideration, given thè 
impossibility of overcoming thè marked inability of thè model 
to interpret its variation. The results are not satisfactory
3.5 France 1950-1979
^ o r  more detailed information on thè data, see Appendix 
III.
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The analysis of annual strikes in France from 1959 to 1971
made by Kemeny is in line with this interpretation. The
positive effécts of the unemployment rate and of the variation
in reai wages (that of the fluctuation in monetary wages is
also positive whereas it is negative for prices) on the
2likelihood of conflict are interpreted as an antagonistic 
offensive which is fundamentally permanent, against the 
politicai, economie and social system having a class matrix.
From this, the author derives a conflicting use of the very 
improvements in labor conditions and a reaction to increasing 
unemployment as an index of the insecure situation which is 
not just economie.
Though remaining consistent with the above, the interpreta­
tion presented in this research constructs, along with the 
positive linear relationship of the unemployment rate, a negative 
one with the inverse of that rate. A positive relation is 
hypothesized between increase in unemployment and likelihood 
of conflict which decreases at unemployment rises.
The results, notwithstanding the high quality of the data3 »used, would lead to the supposition of the presence of claims
for levels of unemployment that are not very high which would
decrease as unemployment rises.
At first glance, this would seem to refute the classic
hypothesis of the restraining effect of the unemployment rate
which assumes a negative relationship between the two variables.
^P. Kemeny (1979).
2These results were accompanied by a lack of significance of 
the political-organizational variables.
3I would like to emphasize that the results presented here 
were obtained using data on the unemployment rate that is 
unreliable. In fact, it is influenced by the opening of the 
Agence National pour L'Emploi. Nonetheless, the results of 
the tests are Constant even if different statistical sources 
are used, e.g., Euro. Stat., O.C.D.E., for the unemployment 
rate, and the Ministere du Travail for the number of unemployed.
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Nonetheless, this theory uses the unemployment rate as an 
indicator of the union's bargaining strength (blackmail power) 
and assumes that in periods of generai unemployment, management 
can easily decide employment levels or choose non-union 
labor willing to work for the offered salary since there is 
an available reserve of labor (the unemployed).
The "classic" theory is then not contradicted by the test 
results, but the work hypothesis presented there is overturned. 
The elaborated model generally attributed a propulsive power 
to unemployment and specifically tried to identify a 
particular level Umax which alarmed the trade union and 
caused the workers to protest in defense of jobs. The 
results of the tests emphasize that at an increase in 
unemployment, its ability to act as a "fuse," is reduced.
3.5.2 Phase II (ifj)
At first, the construction of the variable ip = tU-Umax) 
seems extremely simple. The historical series on unemployment 
rate, whether data from Eurostat or OCDE is used, and 
that on the number of unemployed, using national sources, 
show an increasing course (cf. Table France A). After 1970, 
the data shows inexorable increases. The Umax chosen, 
using the historic series on unemployment rate furnished by 
Eurostat, is fixed at 4%. The number of unemployed, the 
increase by 3,200,000 in job applications, equal to 1.6% in 
19 74— therefore, the level of the number index obtained by 
the series at 200— seemed to be a threshold that was enough 
to mobilize trade union and labor reaction.
The results of the tests in Table 3A will now be analyzed. 
In the first equations the variable obtained from the unemploy­
ment rate has been used; while in the second equations the 
independent variable N obtained from the number of unemployed 
workers (number of job applications) which seemed to better 
balance the bariation in number of jobs offered (V).
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The results, though satisfactory, were in part unexpected. 
The coefficient of determination is 0.68 and D.W. 1.98.
Four variables are significant: trend is negative, lagged
reai wages and their variation is positive, in equation (Ib) 
variations in job offers is also positive— which shows thè 
credit-catch-up effect of wage claims— and the variables ^ 
and Ni|> negative.^- It should be noted that this negative 
result of the regression coefficient of the variables 
ip and is obtained in spite of their simple correlation
with the conflict indicators being positive, respectively 
0.41 and 0.53 with the number of strikes in the entire economy 
and 0.25 and 0.41 with the number of work days lost in the 
manufacturing sector.
To better investigate the negative influence of an 
increase in unemployment rate, the increase of that rate was 
inserted in the equation, see Table 3/B.
The variance in number of strikes explained by the 
variable of the model increases, R 2 in the improved model 
is 0.73. Lagged reai wages and their variation are 
significant and have positive signs. The inverse of the 
unemployment rate and ij/, both significant, have negative 
signs.
The relation between the variables seems to be clearer at 
this point. There is a "credit-catch up" effect of wage 
claims along with a sensitivity of workers to their jobs 
which, nonetheless, is not transformed into conflict if an 
alarming threshold is reached.
Similar results were obtained if the variable is substituted 
by the positive residuals (RES ìp) of the interpolation of 
the unemployment rate with a second degree polynomial.
Time and reai wages are significant. The variable RES ìp 
is significant only in equation (Ib). The determination 
coefficient is less than the corresponding ones in equa­
tions (la) and (Ib).
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Therefore, there seems to be a French pattern of conflict 
which presents a generalized tendency to conflict inhibited by 
thè "gravity" of thè job market.
Moreover, thè classic interpretation of thè effect of 
unemployment would be proposed again, in this case positive, 
but only if it is above a certain restraining level. That is 
to say, if thè unemployment rate reaches high levels, thè black- 
mail power of trade unions is reduced, and thus, also their 
use of strikes as a weapon.
3.5.3 Phase III (AIip)
The preceding results are confirmed by thè introduction 
of thè indicator of thè gravity of thè economie situation AI 
which is constructed as before from thè product of thè
I *P ‘t-lvariation in industriai production AI = —j—p---  and thè
variable i|>, which by now is expected to have a negative 
sign.
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CONCLUSION

-155-
The prime objective of this research was to analyze the 
industriai conflict as manifested through strikes in the 
last thirty years in the three European countries which 
presented the most similarities according to the fundamental 
indicators of conflict: France, Italy and Great Britain
(cfr. Tables 1, 2, 3, Appendix) .
Among the various theoretical paradigms which confront 
the theme of strikes, considering it from time to time as a 
protest originating in rapid social changes (Modernization 
Approach), as a form of collective action (Political- 
Organizational Approach), or as a phase within a process of 
institutionalization of conflict, it seemed more interesting and 
more appropriate to the study at hand, to use the Bargaining 
Theory. It considers strikes as an instrument of pressure 
in response to a lock-out in wage negotiations between 
management and trade union.
If at the dawning of Bargaining Theory, in the formula- 
tions of more direct derivations of the game theory, the strike 
has value only as a potential threat that permits 
equilibrium of solution satisfactory to the parties (models 
with perfect and complete information). Subsequently, the 
occurrence of a strike contributed to reaching an accord and 
its own level.
After examining the origins of Economie Bargaining
Unlike other approaches, Bargaining Theory attributes to 
strikes a limited relevancy to the labor market, though 
not undervaluating the fact that an increase in power and 
influence in the economie system has almost direct 
repercussions on the socio-political one. Choosing 
Bargaining Theory as an interpretative paradigm of strikes 
means to favor their economie connotations and neglect the 
politicai ones.
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Theory within Game Theory and after examining the subsequent 
developments (models with complete and imperfect, and perfect 
and incomplete information), an analysis was made of the 
operational versions of wage negotiations often discussed in 
the literature on conflict. The empirical test results 
were presented schematically.
Moreover, an attempt has been made to identify the 
limitations of the theory in order to overcome them, if possible, 
and to define its applicability.
Above all, a continuous tendency of the partners to 
negotiate, as if they were always seated at the bargaining 
table, has been hypothesized in order to overcome one of 
the greater limitations of Bargaining Theory— considering a 
strike as an action that takes place only after an unfruitful 
attempt to reach an agreement at the expiration of the 
contract.
Other than that, the hypothesis of a very small 
bargaining unit has been used. Imagining a perfect inter- 
changeability between base and union leadership, this theory 
permits one to ignore the relationship between them and to 
legitimate spontaneous strikes. This hypothesis alleviates 
the limitation of bargaining with only two partners, management 
and union, while neglecting government intervention (which 
now is more frequenti.
In this way the economie character of Bargaining Theory 
has been emphasized which in the literature on strikes is 
often inappropriately cited only as an economie approach,
whereas it is part of the more generai approach of 
Game Theory.
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Theory'*’ within Game Theory and after examining thè subsequent 
developments (models with complete and imperfect, and perfect 
and incomplete infccmation), an analysis was made of thè 
operational versior. ^ of wage negotiations often discussed in 
thè literature on conflict. The empirical test results 
were presented scht •natically.
Moreover, an attempt has been made to identify thè 
limitations of thè theory in order to overcome them, if possible, 
and to define its eoplicability.
Above all, a continuous tendency of thè partners to 
negotiate, as if they were always seated at thè bargaining 
table, has been hypothesized in order to overcome one of 
thè greater limita:ions of Bargaining Theory— considering a 
strike as an action that takes place only after an unfruitful 
attempt to reach an agreement at thè expiration of thè 
contract.
Other than that, thè hypothesis of a very small 
bargaining unit ha* been used. Imagining a perfect inter- 
changeability betw :en base and union leadership, this theory 
permits one to ignore thè relationship between them and to 
legitimate spontanaous strikes. This hypothesis alleviates 
thè limitation of bargaining with only two partners, management 
and union, while njglecting government intervention (which 
now is more frequent).
In this way thè economie character of Bargaining Theory 
has been emphasizel which in thè literature on strikes is 
often inappropriat3ly cited only as an economie approach,
whereas it is parJ‘ of thè more generai approach of 
Game Theory.
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The approach and development of this analysis have been 
applied only to the industriai sector because the formulation 
of the employer's objective as maximization of future profit 
value (which pushes him in wage negotiations to try and 
contain labor costs) excludes, or at least makes dubious, 
its application to the public and service sectors.
Nevertheless, the main limit of the Economie Bargaining 
Theory approach is, in my opinion, in considering negotiations 
that center only on wage themes. If though understandable 
for the first models developed in the 50's, for a period in 
America where strikes could be equated with wage claims 
because those represented almost all union protests, it 
subsequently became highly inappropriate and erroneous to 
use in tests of the model global and not only pay strike data.
This lacuna becomes greater and more apparent when, after 
1968 and 1973 in a changed economie context, job loss and 
unemployment press upon everyday working life and job security 
becomes a basic theme of the European trade union movement.
The objective of this work has been to amplify the 
negotiating area of the Bargaining Theory model by first 
introducing modifications in the analytic version and 
then subjecting it to empirical verification in the three 
countries under examination— France, Italy and Britain.
To achieve this, an attempt has been made to insert within 
the bargaining model a labor claims variable. Even though 
such an insertion certainly does not exhaust the range of 
claims and motivations at the base of conflict of 
manifestations, it nonetheless seems to constitute a first 
step in this direction.
In fact, it is my opinion that limiting negotiations to 
only wage claims is the principal cause of the shorteomings 
attributed to the Economie Bargaining Theory in the interpreta­
tion of conflict. This fact created a basic ambiguity in the
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model, which was implicitly based on a procyclic character of 
strikes (increase in conflict at increase in prices and 
decrease in conflict at increase in unemployment) thus 
assuming through strikes a negative relationship among varia­
tions in price and variations in employment of the Phillips 
curve type.
In a period in which the very theory of the Phillips curve 
is under discussion because of the contemporary presence of 
price increases and increases in unemployment, new interpreta­
tive theoretical pictures are sought. Also the conflict 
model shows this inadequacy and the need to explore other ways 
to resolve the problem arises.
To reach this objective, the model proposed by 0. 
Ashenfelter and J. Johnson was used. This model better combines 
theoretical formulations and empirical verification.■*"
It hypothesizes wage negotiations in which the employer 
possesses a monopoly of information: he knows the workers'
concession curve for their wage increase claims for the duration 
of the strike. He decides to concede the increase demanded 
by the workers or to accept the cost of a strike in order to 
reduce their demands. The duration of a strike will depend 
on the maximization of the employer’s profit function subject to 
the limits of the workers' concession curve— in the specific 
case, a negative exponential.
■^ A big limitation of this model is given by the lack of dis- 
tribution of information unilaterally possessed by the 
manager. It nonetheless remains the best example of 
combination of theoretical model and subsequent empirical 
verification. In literature there are more or less 
two large groups studies: theoretical studies related to
game theory and empirical studies in which hypothesis of 
the model to be subjected to verification are directly 
constructed (econometrie).
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The idea of constructing a specific model for only labor 
claims has been rejected, given thè lack of reliable data on 
thè causes of strikes.^ Instead, an attempt has been made to 
widen thè bargaining area of thè Ashenfelter and Johnson model 
by introducing other than wage claims and their discount 
rate during thè strike, r, labor claims with their own 
specific rate of resistance, p.
This has been done in successive steps.
In thè first phase, it was hypothesized that strikes were 
generated only by labor claims and, considering thè fixed wage 
from a previous contract, I inserted in thè Ashenfelter and 
Johnson model labor demand and thè workers1 resistance curve on 
occupational themes.
Moreover, it has been supposed that employment demand 
could be attributed to two distinct claims: with a defensive
one, when production decline, thè firm wants to reduce 
employment. The number of workers thè firm wants to
Aemploy (LQX is less than thè number previously employed (L),
A(LQ < L). With an autonomous one, unemployment increases
and goes from a frictional or cyclic phenomenon to a structural
one which damages thè internai market of thè core groups
[ty = tj (U-Umax) ] . These two types of claims have been inserted
in thè model by hypothesizing in a first approximation that
thè labor claims would be reduced during a prolonged strike
in thè form of a negative exponential function of thè rate K.
In thè second phase, an attempt was made to insert both 
wage and labor claims in a single measure, thè wage bill.
In fact, it has been supposed that bargaining occurs on thè
1The cause of a strike is a variable that can be revealed 
only through ad hoc research; and, thè published officiai 
statistical data divided by cause is not reliable. For 
further specification, see thè Appendix, Limitations 
of Statistics on Strikes.
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entire "workers-wages" and that the union demand wage and 
employment increases that in the course of a strike are reduced 
to a single rate Y. Nevertheless, the employment which 
management wants to hire (LQ) and the previous contract wage 
(W) constitute the limit to the possibility of the wage-bill 
being reduced during strikes. In this case, it has been assumed 
that the form of the concession curve is a negative exponential 
one, even if, as pointed out in Chapter 3, the most likely 
forms can be others. Nonetheless, it seem particularly 
unsatisfactory to use a single worker discount rate and a 
single worker concession curve. It is my opinion, that 
the two claims presents different patterns. The union does 
not negotiate the entire wage-bill but wage and employment 
claims separately with two distinct rates of determination.
In the third phase, the trade union demand has been inserted 
in the model and divided into demands for wage increases (AW) 
with a specific concession rate (p) and labor demands (AL), 
exclusively defensive, with its respective resistance rate (p).
I have made the simplifying assumption that the workers1 
concession functions are linear. They are reduced during 
the strike at two different rates r and p. As before, 
optimal strike duration will be established by the employer 
with the maximization of his profit function now subject to 
two limits: wages and employment.
Solving for the maximum employer's profit 
function, the optimal strike depends, as before, on 
production value (PQ) , on workers' wage claims,,on their 
determination to carry them through (r), on the employer's 
discount rate (t ), and on workers' employment claims (AL) 
and on their determination to defend them (p).
With the lines of workers' resistance and concession forming 
an angle at points ^ and ì, I confronted labor's theoretical
optimal solution of S optimal and analyzed the impact of
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thè variables contposing the solution of the conflict which 
served as a prologue to the operational version.
Without dwelling upon technical details (for which 
reference may be made to Chapter 2), the proposed goal 
was reached in this first part by widening the objectives of ' 
bargaining and thè range of motivation for strikes.
At attempt was made with the operational version to 
empirically verify the model constructed. In the
In the empirical section, I would emphasize that it is 
not within the bounds of this work to identify national 
patterns of conflict indicators. For this purpose, it would 
have been necessary to use various interpretative models.
The scope of that section is only to explore the workings 
of the developed model in the operational version derived.
The most complex problem proved £o be transforming the 
analytical model into a version that could be empirically 
tested.
As was pointed out in Chapter 3, as far as the dependent 
variable is concerned, there is no appropriate indicator to 
measure the duration of a strike, but there are two indicators 
used as proxies: the number of strikes begun in the time
period considered and the number of work hours lost per 
strike, which reflects the component participating workers.
Furthermore, there are no direct measures of the independent 
variables which comprise the model. It has been necessary to 
make some assumptions on the trade union’s and workers' 
behavior in making claims. Particularly, it has been assumed 
that when their purchasing power decreases IRW (-)], workers 
present wage claims that are more tenaciously defended the 
faster the reduction [RW (-)]. On the other hand, a decrease 
in industriai production would lead to an increase in workers' 
employment claims [I.P. (-)], which would be more tenaciously 
defended the higher the probability of unemployment in the
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economy [U(+)]. The variation in industriai production also 
is an indicator of thè willingness of management to adhere to 
workers' demands. If industriai production is greater, thè 
more workers will be willing to concede increases and less 
likely is a prolongation of negotiations and of conflict.
This operational version of thè analytical model has 
been subject to empirical verification in thè three countries 
under consideration, using data both from manufacturing 
industry (thè only sector in which thè model can actually be 
applied) and from thè entire economy.
The generally obtained tests confirm thè validity of 
this contribution; however, it is useful to analyze them in 
more detail.
First, it is important to emphasize that it is not always 
thè same indicator of conflict, that proved itself to be 
susceptible to his interpretation; in Great Britain thè number 
of days lost was thè dominant feature, in Italy, as in 
France, thè dominant feature was thè number of strikes.
Moreover, in Great Britain, in interpreting thè number 
of man-days lost in thè manufacturing industries (MD), thè 
dominant feature seemed to be a model of "credit-catch up" 
wage claims (positive regression coefficient for reai wages 
and their variation and a negative one for price fluctuations) 
united with a defensive one of employment claims for thè 
defense of jobs (positive regression coefficient of unemploy­
ment rate).
It is interesting to note how thè interpretative model 
of strikes improves with thè insertion of thè dependent variable 
\l> = (U-Umax) already described and with its substitution by 
thè indicator of thè gravity of thè economie situation which 
links thè likelihood of unemployment ty = (U-Umax) with 
thè drop in industriai production. The coefficient of 
determination rises from 0.60 to 0.80 and thè significance of
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thè variables of thè model increase while maintaining thè 
efficiency of thè estimate Constant.
The other indicator of conflict, thè number of strikes 
begun in manufacturing industries (MS), shows a positive trend 
and a strong and Constant negative relation to thè unemploy­
ment rate and to other variables representing thè "gravity" 
of thè economie situation tip, Alty) .
It seems that in Great Britain there is a procyclic 
pattern of thè number of strikes (reinforced by thè positiveness 
of reai salary), but a countercyclic one for their duration 
represented as number of man-days lost.
In a period of crisis and fall in production, thè trade 
unions would seem to be more reasonable in their claims, in 
such ways as to make it more difficult to encounter a clear 
refusai on thè part of management, which would provoke a strike 
in order to make thè rank and file accept a reduction in 
initial claims.
Stili, they are very determined in thè claims they present 
and about which they succeed in mobilizing thè workers and in 
protracting manifestations of conflict. These results seem to
sustain thè interpretation of defensive strikes as having a
high rate of participation and of long duration.'*'
The model was inadequate, in thè interpretation of strikes 
referring to thè entire economy. These strikes feel thè 
effeets of thè changing development in thè "mining and quarrying 
sector."
In Italy, as far as thè number of strikes in thè manufac­
turing industries (MS) is concerned, income erosion claims 
(positive fluctuation in prices, negative one in reai wage)
^The measure of thè number of work hours lost per strike
increases both because of thè effect of a longer duration of
thè conflict and thè larger number of workers who participate.
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prevail, combined with claims in defense of employment (ip 
and AIiJj positive).
Moreover, in Italy, the corresponding indicator of 
conflict, referring to the entire economy (GS), adapts itself 
to an economic-industrial type of interpretative model.
Thus, it sometimes even presents better results as in the case 
of the last test in which variations in industriai production 
were substituted by variations in conceded hours of Cassa 
Integrazionale Guadagni in which all the variables are 
significant.
As far as the number of hours lost per strike is concerned, 
a positive trend which absorbs the influx of the other variables 
strongly dominates.
Italian trade unions and workers seem to have a very 
rational behavior concerning their claims and their decision 
to cali a strike, which reflects an erosion of income and a 
defense of employment, whereas regarding the length of a strike, 
non-economic factors external to model are most important.
Finally, as far as France is concerned, the interpretation 
of the results of the tests is a bit probleraatic. In the 
first place, the indicators of number of hours of work lost, 
both for just the manufacturing sector and the entire economy, 
are absolutely not susceptible to the proposai interpretation.
Secondly, since 1967, the other indicator of strike 
numbers per year, though more receptive to interpretation 
according to the proposed model is reported only for strikes 
in the entire economy. A dominating factor seems to be a 
"credit-catch up" type of interpretation concerning wage claims 
and a "quasi-classic" type for employment claims. A generic 
propulsive power of the indicator of unemployment likelihood 
exists which nevertheless overcomes a threshold that is held 
to be maximum when it assumes true characteristics of gravity 
and acts as a brake on claims.
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The perplexities of this interpretation are not only tied 
to the fact of having obtained unforeseen results, but also to 
having used an exclusively economic-industrial theory to explain 
the number of strikes in the entire economy. Furthermore, 
it was accomplished in a country that is not receptive to an 
economie interpretation of industriai relations and that, 
without wanting to give in to the temptations of structural 
explanations, presents a low rate of unionization and a high 
one of politicalization in the work environment.
I would like to conclude with some comments on the 
different levels of generality.
A first observation concerns the results of the tests which, 
even though unpredicted in part, do not negate the validity of 
the analytic model elaborated here (thè three stages in 
Chapter 2) but urge a reconsideration of the proposed opera­
tional version.
On the one hand, the proclaimed economie quality of 
workers1 wage claims is discussed. In Italy, these follow a 
mechanism of income erosion, but in Great Britain and France, 
they seem to follow a "credit-catch up" type of model.
On the other hand, there are not enough reasons to negate 
the existence of claims influenced by the likelihood of 
unemployment in the economy. The need arises to redefine the 
process that gives rise to these claims. The motivations 
for redefining the claim mechanism of employment demands arise 
from having used the variable (ij>) as a proxy for the deter­
mination of the union in defending employment. It hypothesizes 
that there is a level Umax, a so-called politicai 
threshold, that fires the sensitivities of the union and of 
the workers in relation to their jobs. Several procedures 
have been used to choose the level that could trigger this 
claim, while keeping to the principle that a rise in unemploy­
ment rate can only lead to an increase in protests.
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From thè results obtained in thè tests, thè hypothesis was 
confirmed in Great Britain and in Italy, but not in France, 
naturally keeping in consideration thè reservations on this 
last result.
In order to interpret this twofold and contradictory 
effect, thè most fascinating hypothesis is to imagine two 
thresholds of unemployment rate: a first Umax that
awakens worker and trade union interest on thè theme of job 
security, a second utoo-much' higher than thè first, 
that weakens and blocks their own action because it is 
interpreted as unfruitful. These being thè specific thresholds 
of every trade union movement, one could coherently imagine 
in France a generai attention and protest for jobs at a low 
level of unemployment (Umax very low) which becomes 
impotent when thè gravity of thè situation increases.
When placed under a more thorough analysis lays itself 
open to criticism, this hypothesis, as much as it is 
fascinating because it would confute thè "classic" negative 
relationship between unemployment rate and conflict.
As formulated, it is based on thè image of a strong 
union that is rational and well organized and that, when thè 
internai labor market is threatened, readily intervenes and 
protests in thè defense of jobs. When thè unemployment 
threshold is higher and its own protest action would not be 
successful but damage thè entire economy, it does not intervene.
But this same interpretation of thè behavior of thè 
trade union could be reformulated in terms of weakness instead 
of rationality and strength. In thè presence of a weak 
trade union, one has a generalized action in defense 
of jobs that nevertheless will weaken as unemployment rises, 
so much so as to reduce thè conflicts themselves. This 
second interpretation, among other things, better adapts itself 
to thè test results in thè countries under consideration,
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positive effects of the indicators of economie difficulties 
on conflict in Great Britain and Italy, a negative one in 
France, where without a doubt the trade union is weaker 
(unionization rate in France is about 29% while it is about 
40% in the other two countries in the last thirty years)
It also adapts itself to the hypotheses implicitly brought 
forth during the presentation of employment claims and 
explicitly used in the choice of the alarming unemployment rate 
(Umax) in Italy. Employment claims are possible with 
and characteristic of a mature and strong trade union which is 
faced with a criticai phase of production and which wants 
to defend jobs (of its members and nonmembers).
The second comment deals with the aggregate character of 
the analysis developed in this paper.
It would probably be fruitful to a better understanding 
of bargaining mechanisms to integrate the analysis of conflict 
with an examination of the impact some structural changes 
have had on the job market, such as variations in the 
composition of the work force or the transfer of employment 
from one sector to another.
Above all, it would be necessary to identify other measures 
of trade union employment demands and of their determination 
in such a way as to release the unemployment rate from such a 
strong interpretative power. Moreover, because it refers 
to the entire economy, it includes components such as workers 
in search of a first job, unemployment of particular segments 
of the labor force that cannot be interpreted as a generai 
likelihood of unemployment which affeets workers from another
^Cfr. G.P. Cella, 1980; Italy, p. 194; Great Britain, p. 88; 
France, p. 331.
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segment of the labor force, industry.'*'
It would be very useful to keep in mind the effect of 
employment claims, and of labor hoarding which follow 
successful strikes, through researching whether or not the 
claims give way to a perverse causai spirai or if they 
annui themselves.
A third and final comment which is on more generai lines 
deals with an interest in constructing an interpretative 
model for strikes in the tertiary sector. Particularly, it 
would be extremely useful to interpret strikes in such sectors 
as transportation, public administration, and teaching— sectors 
that entered the conflict arena only at the end of the 60's. 
This model would be especially interesting because it would 
find workers' interests opposing not so much those of 
management as much as those of the consumers, or generically 
speaking, of those who use the public and private services.
It would be stimulating to analyze how the reaction of 
consumers influence the willingness of management to 
negotiate and how it influences the determination of the 
workers' concession curve.
I have preferred, for now, to avoid this treacherous 
terrain and to follow the main road of industry while trying 
to contribute improvements to the interpretative model and 
widen the range of bargaining.
The satisfying result for Italy in which youth and workers 
in search for a first job constitute about 50% of the 
recent unemployment rate leads to the belief in the validity 
of using global data (ISTAT, 1980).
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